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Ms. Majola
 Ms. Majola is a proud South African woman from the 
Xhosa ethnic group.  As a consequence of the Group Areas Act, 
the apartheid government evicted Ms. Majola and her family 
from Amstelhof and relocated them to a house in an African 
township called Mbekweni that “was not complete, did not have 
cement, no roof, nothing that showed that it was a home. It 
was very empty.”  Ms. Majola scowled as she remembered “one 
thing that made me have hatred is because the way we leaved 
there and our homes were demolished. Whether you like it 
or not you had to move.  We were having no money and our 
homes were not furnished.”  
 Soon after the transition to democracy in 1994, Ms. 
Majola heard that the new government—led by the African Na-
tional Congress (ANC)—was compensating families like hers 
who were evicted as a result of racially discriminatory policies.  
The Commission gave her R 25,000 (approximately $ 3,571) 
as compensation for the apartheid state’s confiscation of her 
deceased father’s house in Amstelhof.  She spent the financial 
award to improve her father’s home in Mbekweni because she 
thought this was the best way she could honor his memory.  
She explained that during apartheid her father was an ANC 
fighter and so he and the rest of her family made serious sac-
rifices for South Africa’s liberation.  “My father was a ANC. We 
couldn’t go to school because my father was very busy with 
ANC. My father divorced my mother because of ANC.  Did he 
gain something from the ANC, nothing.  Did we go to school, 
no because our father couldn’t support us.  He is in Joburg, 
Durban, all over the world.  The boss of his life was ANC.”   
 Unfortunately,  Ms. Majola’s father did not live to wit-
ness the end of apartheid, but the financial award from the 
Commission allowed her to improve his house so that it could 
stand as a memorial to him.  Ms. Majola said that the money 
was able to heal “some of the wounds” but then she became 
momentarily quiet and pensive then added abruptly “but not 
really.”  
Mr. Rathod
 Mr. Rathod is a proud South African of Indian descent.  As 
a result of the Group Areas Act, Mr. Rathod and his family were 
evicted from Marabastad, a vibrant, mixed-race community in 
Pretoria’s city center, and relocated to Laudium, a township the 
apartheid government reserved exclusively for Asians.  When they 
were forced to leave their beloved home, the apartheid govern-
ment robbed Mr. Rathod’s family of a valuable asset and, more 
detrimentally, it irreparably ripped apart valuable social ties.  Mr. 
Rathod reminisced about the times before the eviction, “When we 
were little kids and we used to play together.  We really used to 
enjoy ourselves and we used to eat, like if your mother cooked we 
all sitting there and in one plate we having our food.  We eating 
out of one plate.  It was a beautiful time I really, I thank the, I thank 
God for letting me live in those years.”  
 Now, Mr. Rathod complained, life in Laudium is noth-
ing like Marabastad “my neighbors they won’t even tell you good 
morning.”  Although nothing could compensate Mr. Rathod for the 
lifelong relationships that he lost when the apartheid government 
evicted him and his family from Marabastad, he lodged a claim 
for compensation with the Commission.  The Commission paid R 
80,000 (approximately $ 11,428) in compensation for the racially 
motivated confiscation of his father’s property in Marabastad.  Mr. 
Rathod, however, received only R 10,000 (approximately $ 1,428) 
after the sum was split between his father’s eight children.  
 Mr. Rathod could have used the award to complete a 
minor home improvement, but his house was already renovated.  
He could have used the award to take classes, but he is retired 
and no longer interested in improving his human capital.  He could 
have invested the award in his family’s education, but his children 
are educated, economically stable, and not in need of his monetary 
contributions.  He could have invested the award in a high yield 
financial instrument, but the return on R 10,000 was not worth 
the trouble to Mr. Rathod, a successful businessman who owned 
a driving school and a trucking business at one time.  Like many 
other respondents from the upper-class, Mr. Rathod spent his 
financial award on non-essentials.  
 “Man, to tell you the truth professor, I had to buy a TV 
for my son and I don’t know what I did with the other money.  I 
really, I even forgot.”  Then he looked slyly at his wife sitting next to 
him and suddenly a mischievous smile broke across his face as he 
confessed to me while still gazing at his wife, “but I think I went to 
the casino to tell professor the truth.”  His guilty admission caused 
us all to burst into raucous laughter.
CLAIMANT PROFILES
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 The constitution of South Africa mandates equitable redress for individuals and communi-
ties who colonial and apartheid era governments took land from after 1913 as a result of racially 
discriminatory laws and practices. However, the constitution also allows current owners to main-
tain possession of their land regardless of the manner in which this land was obtained.  In order to 
accommodate both of these sometimes conflicting constitutional mandates, the Land Restitution 
Commission (the Commission) has provided equitable redress for dispossessed populations either 
by giving them financial compensation or purchasing land for them from current owners.  
 
Did Financial Compensation Contribute to Eco-
nomic Development?:  The Commission’s Top-
Down Perspective
 The function of equitable redress is not only to compensate past victims for financial losses, 
but also to economically empower South Africa’s black majority. The Commission’s pervasive, institu-
tion-wide assumption is that recipients wasted the financial awards because the money is gone and 
they are still in poverty.  Consequently, in recent years, the Commission has shifted its policies away 
from its former emphasis on financial compensation as a means of granting equitable redress and 
toward a strong emphasis on land restitution.  
Did Financial Compensation Contribute to Eco-
nomic Development?:  Beneficiaries’ Bottom-Up 
Perspective
 In contrast to the Commission’s assumption that financial compensation did not result in 
economic empowerment and its consequent policy shift, the interviews I conducted with financial 
award recipients show that in 30 percent of the cases the award did produce a substantial  
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economic benefit.  The majority of these people spent their financial award on improving their cur-
rent home and thus increasing the value of their primary asset.  
 The evidence showed that financial compensation did not have an enduring economic impact 
when recipients:
• received small awards or awards that constituted only small percentages of their overall 
net worth;
• were more interested in making cultural rather than economic investments;
• were older and had a self interest in experiencing the benefits of the financial award while 
they were still alive rather than spending their awards in ways that would produce a long-
term economic impact that would primarily benefit others; or
• had several economically dependent family members.  
Policy Recommendations
 Since the empirical evidence shows that financial compensation did produce a long-term 
economic benefit under certain circumstances, the Commission must reconsider its policy of de-
emphasizing the financial compensation option and instead adopt policies that improve this option 
by:
Increasing the impact of smaller financial awards
• Allow claimants to choose between various forms of equitable redress, while providing 
incentives for claimants to select options that will produce a long-term economic benefit.  
• Provide financial counseling to claimants who elect to receive financial compensation. 
Increasing the amount of financial awards
• Increase the amount of financial awards by treating beneficial occupants on par with dis-
possessed owners.  
• Pay current owners just compensation rather than the more costly market value of their 
property when purchasing land for dispossessed populations and use the savings to in-
crease the amount of financial awards.  
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 In order to promote social reconstruc-
tion, transitional states often must deal with 
past injustice. One particularly difficult issue 
frequently facing these states is what to do 
when former regimes have unjustly confiscated 
property from one group and given it to an-
other.  The most common response is to do 
nothing. But South Africa, Kosovo, Romania, the 
Baltic Republics, El Salvador, Colombia, Ger-
many, Guatemala, Hungary, Slovakia, and the 
Czech Republic are among the few nations that 
have compensated their citizens for property 
violations that occurred under prior regimes. 1  
South Africa, however, stands head and shoul-
ders above other nations because its citizens 
have a unique constitutional right to restitution 
for past property violations. 2
 During South Africa’s colonial and apart-
heid eras, the white minority usurped property 
from millions of nonwhites without paying just 
compensation. 3   In the political transition from 
apartheid to democracy, the incoming political 
administration—led by the African National 
Congress (ANC)—entered into a bargain with 
the outgoing apartheid government that dic-
tated what the new democratic state could do 
to correct past land theft. The ANC conceded 
to the apartheid government’s demand to  
constitutionally protect existing property rights 
regardless of how the owners had acquired 
their property. 4  This meant that even if, for 
example, the apartheid government had  
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQ-
UITABLE REDRESS
The constitution of South Africa affords equitable redress to 
individuals and communities dispossessed of their land after 
1913 as a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices. 
Those dispossessed are entitled to compensation by way 
of financial award or land restitution.  This study analyzes 
only the financial awards the Commission gave to people 
evicted from urban areas.  
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confiscated land from a black community and 
transferred it at nominal cost to a white farmer, 
if the farmer still owned the land at the end 
of the apartheid regime, under section 25(1) 
of the constitution, his rights to that land were 
secure.
 In exchange for this ample concession, 
the ANC ensured that individuals and com-
munities dispossessed of their land under white 
minority rule were afforded certain constitu-
tional remedies as well. Section 25(7) of the 
South African Constitution states that a “person 
or community dispossessed of property after 
19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discrimi-
natory laws or practices is entitled, to the ex-
tent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to 
restitution of that property or to equitable re-
dress.” 5  Section 25 does not provide a remedy 
for the vast majority of unjust land confiscations 
that took place prior to 1913 under colonial-
ism; instead, the liberation bargain only ensures 
a remedy for property violations that occurred 
after 1913, the year that the South African state 
(formed in 1910) first used its legislative pow-
ers to dispossess Africans through the Native 
Land Act. 6  
 The Restitution of Land Rights Act of 
1994 (the Act) is the parliamentary act that 
gives Section 25(7) life. The Act charges the 
Land Claims Commission (the Commission) 
with implementing South Africa’s restitution 
program. 7  As of March 31, 2008, the Commis-
sion had rejected or authorized compensation 
for (that is, “settled”) 95 percent of the 74,747 
claims lodged by dispossessed individuals and 
communities—a laudable achievement by any 
measure. 8   The Commission settled claims pri-
marily by providing financial awards or restitu-
tion of land to people evicted from both urban 
and rural areas. This study, however, focuses 
exclusively on the 47,726 claims in which the 
Commission gave financial awards to people 
evicted from urban areas. 9
A person or community dispossessed 
of property after 19 June 1913 as a 
result of past racially discriminatory 
laws or practices is entitled, to the ex-
tent provided by an Act of Parliament, 
either to restitution of that property or 
to equitable redress.
4
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 While, under the provisions of the Act, 
1913 is the key year for determining eligibility 
for restitution, the majority of urban evictions 
happened under the Group Areas Act of 1950, 
which was intended to accelerate the policy of 
separate development by removing Africans, 
Asians, and Coloureds from urban areas de-
marcated for white occupancy. 10   According 
to the best estimates available, between 1960 
and 1983 the apartheid government removed 
approximately 3.5 million people from metro-
politan areas to either the cities’ peripheries or 
to remote, rural homelands. 11  Vibrant commu-
nities were dismantled, tight-knit families were 
separated, and valuable property was lost.
According to the best estimates avail-
able, between 1960 and 1983 the 
apartheid government removed ap-
proximately 3.5 million people from 
metropolitan areas to either the cities’ 
peripheries or to remote, rural home-
lands
 One such community destroyed by the 
Group Areas Act was Marabastad, a bustling, 
mixed-raced neighborhood in Pretoria’s city 
center. Mrs. Green is the alias I have given to a 
Coloured woman and former resident of Mara-
bastad who owned a lovely eleven-room house 
there with her husband. 12   She reminisced with 
affection:  “the people of Marabastad, we were 
like a family. We knew each other.”  Through-
out the 1950s, the apartheid government de-
stroyed these valuable social bonds by evicting 
Marabastad’s residents and relocating them to 
various townships far from the city center. Afri-
cans were essentially dumped in Atteridgeville, 
Coloureds in Eersterust, and Asians in Laudium. 
Mrs. Green’s home was expropriated without 
just compensation, and her family was forced 
to relocate to Eersterust. She is now a senior 
citizen but still vividly remembers the bitter day 
that she was essentially discarded:
My second baby Al was two weeks 
old. Two weeks, and they just come. 
They never gave us letters to say we 
must move to this place. They just 
come, said, “You must out, now, furni-
ture and everything,” and just put it on 
the truck and said, “You going to this 
place.” … They lock my husband up. 
I … I really do … don’t know for what. 
Ja. My husband was locked up. They 
couldn’t tell me why, and they come 
after three weeks and told me, “Here’s 
the lorry.” They just put the baby’s cot 
first. I said, “But my baby, the milk, 
and everything.” They said, “No, no, 
no, no, no. Just come.” “Where are we 
going?” “No, you’ll see … You’ll see 
for yourself.” 13   
Mrs. Green’s husband was never released and 
died in jail about eight years after this  
5
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harrowing experience. The Commission paid 
Mrs. Green R 60,000 (approximately $ 8,571) 
to satisfy its constitutional obligation to provide 
equitable redress for the property that the 
apartheid government stole from her family. 14  
 There was a crippling and enduring 
economic effect when former governments 
confiscated property from Mrs. Green and 
others like her.  Wealth is an intergenerational 
phenomenon: it is accumulated during a per-
son’s lifetime and then passed along to kin. 15  
Likewise, disadvantage is also accumulated over 
generations such that the devastating tremors 
from the initial theft of assets—like the theft of 
Mrs. Green’s house—reverberate through  
time. 16  In South Africa, Africans and Coloureds 
presently occupy the lowest rungs on the 
economic ladder, due in part to the fact that 
they have not recovered from the catastrophic 
depletion of their assets during colonialism 
and apartheid.  Whites, on the other hand, are 
6
economically dominant, in part because they 
directly or indirectly benefited from past theft 
perpetrated by colonial and apartheid-era gov-
ernments.  
In South Africa, Africans and Coloureds 
presently occupy the lowest rungs on 
the economic ladder, due in part to the 
fact that they have not recovered from 
the catastrophic depletion of their as-
sets during colonialism and apartheid
 The Commission is a key player in South 
Africa’s reconciliation process, and its job is not 
just to determine and distribute equitable re-
dress but also to ensure the awards contribute 
toward the larger societal goal of social recon-
struction.  One important way that the Com-
mission can work toward this goal is by ensur-
ing that these financial awards have a long-term 
economic impact so that past theft no longer 
debilitates future generations.  
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RESEARCH QUESTION
Did the financial awards that the Commission gave to peo-
ple evicted from urban areas increase their net assets or 
were the awards consumed with no appreciable effect on 
the long-term economic well-being of award recipients? 
7
       According to the Act, the vision is “to be 
leaders in the restitution of land rights to vic-
tims of racial land dispossession in a manner 
that ensures sustainable socio-economic devel-
opment.” 17   As of March 31, 2008, the Com-
mission had spent R 4.9 billion (approximately $ 
700 million) on financial awards. 18   It is impor-
tant to understand how individuals spent the 
money in order to assess whether the awards 
had an enduring economic impact and contrib-
uted to sustainable socio-economic develop-
ment.  
 Using data from eighty semi-structured 
interviews, this study will explore whether (a) 
the financial compensation the South African 
government gave to Mrs. Green and other 
people similarly evicted from urban areas has 
increased their net assets; or (b) the compensa-
tion was consumed and has had no appreciable 
effect on their long-term economic well-being. 
In this study, the terms enduring and long-term 
economic impact are synonymous with an ap-
preciable increase in net assets.  
 Although the focus of this study is the 
economic effect of compensation, I embrace 
the fact that this is not the only (or, necessar-
ily, the most important) lens through which 
to view the restitution program’s outcomes. 
In future works, I will evaluate the program’s 
outcomes from other perspectives. 19   Without 
insinuating that there is one right way to spend 
a financial award, 20   I will explore whether the 
awards had a long-term economic benefit for 
recipients. 
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PRIOR STUDIES
The existing research suggests that individuals are more 
likely to save rather than consume a large financial award, 
as compared to a small award; however, the current litera-
ture has yet to examine the reason behind this pattern of 
behavior. 
8
 Economists have developed a substan-
tial literature examining consumption patterns 
among the poor.  There are, for instance, stud-
ies about how the poor in the United States 
spend windfall (or unexpected) income such as 
the Earned Income Tax Credit, which consists 
of one large payment per year. 21  These stud-
ies find that most expenditure goes toward 
durable goods, especially vehicle purchases 
and transportation spending. 22  In addition to 
the literature about the spending patterns of 
indigent populations, economists have devel-
oped consumption theory, which predicts how 
people, regardless of their income or class, will 
spend windfall income such as the financial 
awards distributed by the Commission. Milton 
Freidman, the progenitor of this literature, sug-
gests in his permanent income hypothesis that 
the marginal propensity to consume windfall 
income is considerably smaller than the mar-
ginal propensity to consume out of permanent 
income.23  That is, people are more likely to 
save windfall income (like financial awards) than 
permanent income. 
People were more likely to save rather 
than consume larger financial awards.
 
 Kreinin, in his empirical study using data 
from eighty-one Israelis affected by the Holo-
caust who, like the respondents in this study, re-
ceived financial awards, found considerable sup-
port for Freidman’s hypothesis. 24   Landsberger 
refined Kreinin’s study by investigating the effect 
of the windfall payment’s size. 25   When he 
separated 297 Israelis who received financial 
compensation from the German government 
into five groups, Landsberger found that the 
marginal propensity to consume decreased as 
the size of the windfall payment increased,  
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validating Friedman’s hypothesis.26   That is, 
people were more likely to save rather than 
consume larger financial awards.27   If Lands-
berger’s work holds in the context of payments 
made through the South African Land Restitu-
tion Program, then my data should show that 
larger financial awards result in an increase in 
net assets while smaller awards are consumed, 
with no long-term impact.  
 Since the literature has been dominated 
by economists, studies examining consump-
9
tion patterns have been primarily quantitative.  
Thus, while the studies were able to determine 
the marginal propensity to consume windfall 
income with a high level of statistical certainty, 
they could not offer deep insights into why peo-
ple fell into those particular spending patterns.  
To evaluate whether the Commission achieved 
the Act’s objective of promoting sustainable so-
cioeconomic development, this qualitative study 
employs a socio-legal analysis that uses in-depth 
interviews to analyze consumption patterns.  
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METHODOLOGY
The study is based on twenty-five in-depth interviews with 
Commission officials and eighty in-depth interviews with 
claimants who received financial awards from the Gauteng 
and Western Cape Regional Land Claims Commissions. 
10
Method for collecting the 
data
 From February to August of 2008, I con-
ducted twenty-five semi-structured interviews 
of Commission officials, which lasted between 
thirty to ninety minutes each, were audio taped, 
transcribed and were not completely confi-
dential.  I also completed 141 semi-structured 
interviews of urban claimants that also lasted 
between thirty to ninety minutes, were audio 
taped and transcribed with the promise of 
confidentiality (pseudonyms mask the respon-
dents’ identities).28   Since the research ques-
tion I address here is whether the financial 
compensation distributed by the Commission 
has increased recipients’ net assets, the sample 
I use in this study is limited to eighty of the 141 
interviews in which the respondents received 
financial compensation as opposed to 
 restitution of land.  
 Before conducting any interviews, I ob-
tained human subjects approval from my uni-
versity.  To select interview candidates, I relied 
heavily upon the Commission’s financial data 
lists, which are organized by community, contain 
the names of all beneficiaries who received 
financial compensation, and list the amounts 
that they received.  I first selected a community 
based on certain variables of interest such as 
race, award size, pre-eviction occupancy status, 
award options, and effectiveness of community 
leaders.  I then randomly selected claimants in 
that community from the financial data list.  For 
about three-quarters of the claimants randomly 
selected, I was able to find a working phone 
number from the Commission’s records de-
partment; and over 90 percent of the people I 
was able to reach agreed to be interviewed.29   
I conducted 80 percent of these interviews 
entirely in English.  In those instances when the 
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respondent was not comfortable speaking in 
English, I used a translator.  I conducted the vast 
majority of the interviews in the respondents’ 
homes so that I could verify certain facts such 
as whether respondents used the compensation 
to renovate their homes.  
 Although multiple family members were 
entitled to compensation, I found that the Com-
mission generally communicated with (and 
had contact information for) only one family 
member known as the claimant.  Therefore, 
the downside of relying on the Commission’s 
records was that active claimants—who were 
constantly interacting with the Commission—
accounted for about 81 percent of all respon-
dents interviewed.  Consequently, my data have 
a particular bias because these claimants were 
likely to have different opinions and experi-
ences than those family members who played 
more passive roles.  I tried to mitigate this bias 
by asking primary claimants to put me in touch 
with other family members who had not played 
significant roles in the claims process, but I was 
successful in fewer than five instances.  
 Although locating respondents primarily 
using the Commission’s financial data lists and 
records was not perfect, it was superior to the 
alternative—the snowballing method—in which 
referrals from initial respondents generate addi-
11
tional respondents.  Snowballing can introduce 
a more severe bias because the resulting data 
may reflect the views of a limited network of 
acquaintances; thus it is best to use snowballing 
for people who are difficult to identify.  Conse-
quently, I relied on snowballing to identify less 
than one-quarter of my sample, most of whom 
were community leaders whom I was unlikely 
to randomly choose using the financial data list 
but who had a wealth of information that was 
extremely valuable to this study.  
 The methods I employed have certain 
limitations.  First, I did not collect data on the 
ethnicity of Africans and so cannot discuss the 
ways in which ethnicity informed how respon-
dents spent their financial awards.  Second, the 
data are not generalizable to the entire popula-
tion because 47,726 urban claimants received 
financial awards, but I interviewed only eighty; 
and while I did randomly select respondents in 
each community, I did not randomly select the 
communities.  Consequently, my findings are 
best suited to generating theory.  
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Description of the sample
  Table 1
 Region Gauteng Western Cape
36 44
 Gender Female Male Mixed Gender 
Interview
39 39 2
Race African Coloured Indian White
30 39 5 6
 Level of  
involvement
Active Claimant Community  
Leader
Passive Claimant Unassigned
55 10 13 2
 Age 60 and under 61-75 76 and above
21 47 12
Relation to ODI 
(Originally  
Dispossessed 
Individual)
ODI Child Grandchild
11 55 14
 Employment Working Unemployed Unemployed  
Pensioner
Unkown
25 5 49 1
Owner or tenant at 
time of eviction
Owner Tenant
35 45
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 Since this study exclusively addresses 
urban claimants, I limited the sample to claims 
originating in South Africa’s two principal urban 
centers—Gauteng and Western Cape (see 
Table 1).30 45 percent of respondents were 
from Gauteng, while 55 percent were from the 
Western Cape.  
 As seen in Table 2, one main difference 
between the two provinces is that Gauteng 
systematically paid higher financial awards than 
the Western Cape; in all regional offices, except 
Gauteng, the Commission gave dispossessed 
tenants lower financial awards than the awards 
given to dispossessed owners on the principle 
that ownership rights were more valuable than 
tenancy rights.  In Gauteng the early regional 
land claims commissioner, Blessing Mphela, 
made an executive decision to pay both groups 
equally; hence the average payout in Gauteng 
was consistently higher.31   
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Table 2
Community 
name
Median 
Individual 
Payout
Median 
Award for 
Family 
Claim
Western Cape
White 200,000 360,000
District Six 18,000 38,00
Paarl 25,580 25,580
Luylol 11,250 22,500
Mossel Bay 12,852 45,600
Steurhof 14,280 35,400
Die Eiland 11,429 17,500
Dysseldorp 4,893 29,500
Other 3,166 40,000
Gauteng
Kliptown 50,000 102,020
Evation 35,910 142,450
Kilnerton 28,335 113,343
Sophiatown 28,000 70,000
Marabastad 46,666 60,000
 This study separates claimants into three 
employment categories—working (31 per-
cent), unemployed pensioners (61 percent), and 
unemployed (6 percent). The working category 
includes people who were working both part- 
and full-time regardless of age. The unemployed 
pensioners category includes respondents aged 
sixty or older whose primary sources of income 
were their old-age pensions.  The unemployed 
segment covers respondents under sixty who 
were not working. Only 26 percent of the 
sample was under sixty at the time of the study, 
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and most of those people were working.32   The 
vast majority of respondents (74 percent) were 
sixty or older and thus eligible for old-age pen-
sions.33  Most urban evictions were executed 
under the authority of the Group Areas Act of 
1960; so many of the Originally Dispossessed 
Individuals (ODIs) were deceased, and their 
children (who were pensioners by the time of 
the study) were receiving compensation in their 
place.  While 14 percent of respondents in this 
study were ODIs,34  69 percent were their chil-
dren, and 18 percent were their grandchildren.  
The sample was balanced along gender lines 
(50 percent women and 50 percent men) and, 
in terms of race, included Africans (38 percent), 
Coloureds (49 percent), Indians (6 percent), 
and whites (8 percent).35   The majority of 
African claims originated from Gauteng, while 
the Coloured claims were principally from the 
Western Cape.  The few whites in the sample 
all hailed from the Western Cape and were 
mostly working people under sixty.36  All the In-
dians in the sample were from a community in 
Gauteng called Marabastad; they were primarily 
male due to cultural norms of inheritance.37   
 Determining each respondent’s class sta-
tus was a challenge since data on annual salaries 
were not available.  However, since I conducted 
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the vast majority of interviews in respondents’ 
homes, I was able to observe their surroundings 
and possessions. I supplemented these observa-
tions with information that was revealed during 
the interview to assign each respondent a class 
status. I classified a person as poor if it ap-
peared they were struggling to pay for the basic 
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necessities of life such as food and shelter. I 
classified them as working poor if they owned 
a home and either someone in the household 
was working or the necessities of life were 
covered through some other source of in-
come.  I applied the term middle class if they 
owned a home, the basic necessities of living 
were covered, and the respondents enjoyed 
some amenities such as nice furniture. I re-
served the upper class tag for respondents 
who owned either homes that were far su-
perior to others in the townships or modest 
homes in more expensive neighborhoods, and 
enjoyed amenities such as cars. In the sample, a 
statistically significant correlation existed be-
tween being poor and being a woman or an 
African. 
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DID FINANCIAL COMPENSATION 
CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC  DE-
VELOPMENT? THE COMMISSION’S  
TOP-DOWN PERSPECTIVE
Interviews show that Commission officials believe that 
financial compensation did not have an enduring economic 
impact on recipients because after the awards were spent, 
they were still in the same economic position. 
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The Commission’s process 
for distributing financial 
compensation
 The dominant view among Commission 
officials is that financial compensation has not 
had a long-term economic benefit for claimants. 
In order to understand the issue fully, however, 
one must have a basic knowledge of how the 
land restitution process has unfolded.  In the 
first of five phases, an individual or community 
had to lodge a claim by December 31, 1998, 
in order to become eligible for compensation; 
these people were called claimants.  In the 
second phase, the Commission determined if 
the claims were valid by researching whether 
the claims met certain statutory requirements.  
Each claim had to involve (1) a person, commu-
nity, or a deceased estate or direct descendant 
of a person or a community (2) dispossessed 
of a right in land (3) after June 19, 1913 (4) as 
a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices (5) without the receipt of just and 
equitable compensation.38   
 Once the Commission determined that 
a claim fulfilled these statutory requirements, 
the Commission verified in the third phase 
that the claimant was either the prior owner 
or occupant of the property in question or the 
descendant of the prior owner or occupant.  
The Commission accepted various forms of 
evidence to validate and verify claims, including 
deeds, oral testimony, aerial maps, ruins,  
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tombstones, and baptismal records.  
 During the fourth phase, called the ne-
gotiation phase, the Commission was supposed 
to give claimants a choice between financial 
compensation, land restitution, or some other 
equitable remedy.  The White Paper on Land 
Policy, the government’s definitive policy on 
land matters, states that choice is to be central 
to the restitution process: “solutions must not 
be forced on people.”39   But, in truth, almost 
no one had the opportunity to craft his or her 
own equitable remedy because giving claim-
ants choice and allowing them to craft their 
own remedies would have involved taking time 
to consult with claimants and devise workable 
arrays of options.40    The Commission had no 
such time; it had resolved very few claims from 
1995 to 1999 and so from 2000 to 2008 was 
under extreme pressure to settle claims rapid-
ly.41   
 Due to time pressures, the Commis-
sion not only failed to allow claimants to craft 
their own equitable remedies, but it also heav-
ily encouraged claimants to accept financial 
compensation because this allowed it to settle 
claims more rapidly.  The alternative—land 
restitution—involves an expensive and lengthy 
process requiring the government to identify 
suitable land, purchase it, transfer it to claimants, 
and provide various forms of post-settlement 
support.  The Commission initially encouraged 
claimants to choose financial compensation 
because it was easier and quicker.  
 During the fifth and final (valuation) 
phase, the Commission determined the amount 
of financial compensation it paid claimants.  
The Commission paid most claimants using a 
Standard Settlement Offer (SSO) that did not 
reflect the current market value of the proper-
ties in question or the properties’ market value 
at the time of the evictions.  The SSO ranged 
from R 17,000 to R 60,000 (approximately $ 
2,428 to $ 8,571) depending upon the SSO 
amount adopted by each Regional Land Claims 
Commission, which changed over time.  In most 
regions there were different SSO amounts for 
tenants and owners.  The SSOs for tenancy 
rights started at R 17,000, an amount based on 
the cost of serviced sites in the areas the state 
dispossessed the claimants from or the value of 
the housing grants.  This amount increased on 
an annual basis as the housing subsidy increased. 
To determine the SSO for owners, each region-
al office calculated the average municipal value 
for owners in a sample of areas in that region.  
In both Gauteng and the Western Cape the 
SSO started at R 40,000 (approximately  
$ 5,714) and eventually increased to R 60,000. 
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In 2003, the Minister of Land Affairs approved 
the sliding scale, which allowed the Commission 
to give increased compensation to dispossessed 
owners whose land was in excess of six hun-
dred square meters.42   
The Commission’s per-
spective on financial 
compensation
One Commission official estimated that 
only “one out of ten make something 
out of the compensation
 By 2007 the Commission settled most 
of its urban claims and completely switched its 
focus away from providing financial compen-
sation to fervently encouraging communities 
and individuals to choose land restitution.  For 
varying reasons, most officials regret initially 
giving claimants the option to receive finan-
cial compensation in the negotiation phase.  In 
interviews, some officials indicated it was a bad 
idea because they believed people wasted the 
money.  One Commission official estimated 
that only “one out of ten make something out 
of the compensation.”43   Some officials insisted 
that claimants spent the money on frivolous, 
counterproductive expenditures.  An official in 
the Western Cape RLCC was convinced that 
“financial compensation is not having an effect.  
We will assist with payment in the morning, and 
in the evening everyone is in the bottle store. 
They don’t know what to do with the money.”44 
Another official shared a similar sentiment, he 
felt that “cash is spent over a weekend, and 
then they have no cash and no land.”45   
“Financial compensation is not having 
an effect.  We will assist with payment 
in the morning, and in the evening ev-
eryone is in the bottle store. They don’t 
know what to do with the money.”
 A different, more compassionate view 
expressed by officials in the Commission was 
that people spent the financial award on daily 
survival rather than on alcohol or weekend 
revelry.  Tozi Gwanya, the Director General 
of Land Affairs, succinctly articulated this view 
when he stated that
the [Land Restitution] Act should not 
have given the option of financial 
compensation because the money is 
consumed and there is no long-term 
effect. We could have done without 
financial compensation if there were 
other options, creative options that 
could have a transformative impact; 
but proper thought was not put into 
it. If we were given another opportu-
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nity, things would be different, but it 
is now too late in the afternoon. Now 
we are just left with the rural claims, 
and these will be land restoration. 
We wrongfully assumed that people 
are mature and can make their own 
decisions, which is usually a good 
assumption. But, once you factor in 
poverty there is no rational thinking; 
when you are poor what you eat next 
informs you.46 
Mr. Gwanya’s comments are informed by the 
fact that land restitution is more economically 
advantageous than financial compensation for 
this reason:  While many individuals and com-
munities lost grazing or usufruct rights to bar-
ren land, through the restitution program, they 
received full ownership rights to land with im-
provements.  In contrast, claimants who chose 
financial compensation only received paltry 
financial awards that were often far below the 
historic or current value of the property rights 
that were unjustly extinguished by the apart-
heid and colonial-era governments.  
 As a result, one Commission official 
emphasized, “I am not encouraging them to opt 
for financial compensation because, if removed 
as tenant, they get paid R 40,000.  If they were 
an owner, then they get R 40,000 plus the slid-
ing scale.  It is under compensation only when 
cash is involved; but with development they get 
more because many lost barren land, and now 
they are assisted in getting a top structure.”47   
The commissioner of the Western Cape RLCC, 
Beverly Jansen, agreed that those who chose 
financial compensation were undercompen-
sated because “we cannot afford to pay current 
market price for ownership, so we have the 
SSO, which is not market related.  If we could 
do it again, then there would be no cash com-
pensation or only in rare cases.”48   
“If we could do it again, then there 
would be no cash compensation or 
only in rare cases.”
 Part of the conundrum for Commission 
officials was why people chose financial com-
pensation when it was not the most economi-
cally beneficial choice.  William Nero, Deputy 
Director of the Western Cape Regional Land 
Claims Commission, concluded that “a lot took 
financial compensation, and I am disappointed. 
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It makes me sad because it will not change their 
life, and it is not sustainable.  It does not make 
sense.  I ask myself why, and I think people are 
settled where they are, or people are so poor 
they see this as a temporary relief because pov-
erty is endemic in the Cape Flats.”49   
 Some Commission officials believed that 
financial compensation was detrimental not 
only because people were undercompensated 
but also because it undermined the larger 
land reform project.  At the end of apartheid, 
87 percent of the arable land was owned by 
whites, who constituted less than 10 percent of 
the population.50   Consequently, land reform 
was imperative.  In 1994 the new political dis-
pensation, advised by the World Bank, aimed to 
redistribute 30 percent of the country’s agricul-
tural land in five years; but less than 1 percent 
was redistributed by 1999, less than 3 percent 
by 2003, and less than 5 percent by 2008.51   
Land redistribution, land restitution, and tenure 
upgrading are the three central prongs of the 
national land reform strategy, and land restitu-
tion accounted for 1.5 percent of the 5 percent 
that had been redistributed as of 2008.52   But, 
without the financial compensation option, the 
Commission could have contributed far more 
than 1.5 percent to the national goal.  
 Peter Piccolo, a Commission official,  
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insisted that “land reform’s purpose is to re-
store lost land rights or reallocate land to those 
who were formerly disqualified.  Land reform is 
not the success all hoped it would be because 
financial compensation is a valid and legal op-
tion. If this choice was not given, then we may 
have seen other outcomes.”53   Angela Conway, 
the executive director of a land-based NGO, 
Southern Cape Land Committee (SCLC), 
emphatically agreed saying “I think cash com-
pensation is horrible.  It will not transform levels 
of poverty and land ownership.  Claimants are 
elderly, and it [the evictions] happened long 
ago, and they are too old to move back. [The 
financial compensation] gets you out of debt, 
and it can buy a secondhand television or car, 
but it does not address skewed land ownership 
patterns.”54   
 While different reasons were given for 
why financial compensation was a bad option, 
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the resounding conclusion among  Commis-
sion officials was that the financial awards did 
not have an economically sustainable benefit 
for claimants.  The data I collected confirm that 
some claimants did spend their financial awards 
such that they experienced no increase in their 
net assets, but significant evidence also indi-
cates that people spent the money such that 
they have experienced sustainable economic 
benefits.  Commission officials assumed that 
compensation had no long-term effect if ben-
eficiaries spent their financial award, but officials 
failed to consider how that money was spent.  
 For instance, Commissioner Mphela put 
it this way: “They spend it. Once the money is in 
hand, then poor people cannot postpone con-
sumption.  They spend it on tombstones, addi-
tions to their house, and school fees.”55   Com-
missioner Jansen also remarked, “I know many 
people are poor and the needs were so great 
that the money was used up in the first three 
months.  It was for food and clothing, adding on 
a room in the house, or buying a bed.  Financial 
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compensation cannot have a long-term effect 
on people’s lives, but where they have  
development [land restitution], the effect can 
be generational.”56   
 But what Mr. Mphela, Mrs. Jansen, and 
other Commission officials do not fully ac-
knowledge is that the key factor is not whether 
the money is gone, but how it was used. For 
example, when people use their financial com-
pensation to extend their homes or undergo 
significant home renovations, this increases the 
value of a primary asset, which they can pass 
on to future generations.  There is also a long-
term economic benefit when a person uses the 
money to purchase an asset that can generate 
capital such as a taxi, a high-yield investment 
instrument, or tertiary education.  These in-
vestments have the potential to benefit future 
generations just as the restitution of land does.  
 In the next section, I will move beyond 
the assumptions of Commission officials and 
use the interview data to explore whether 
financial compensation led to long-term eco-
nomic benefits.  
PAYING FOR THE PAST:  ADDRESSING PAST PROPERTY VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
DID FINANCIAL COMPENSATION 
CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT? CLAIMANTS’ BOT-
TOM-UP PERSPECTIVE
Contrary to the Commission’s perspective, interviews with 
recipients of financial awards indicate that for 30 percent of 
respondents the award had a long-term economic benefit.
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 Using qualitative data analysis software, I 
coded each interview transcript and marked re-
spondents’ explanations of what they purchased 
with their financial awards.  If a respondent used 
the compensation such that it would increase 
his or her net assets and have a long-term 
economic effect, then I labeled this a substantial 
economic impact.  This includes instances when 
people used their compensation to undertake 
major home renovations—such as purchas-
ing new roofs or ceilings, extending homes, or 
plastering their houses—that were likely to in-
crease the value of their homes.  It also includes 
instances in which people used the money to 
secure tertiary education or purchase income-
generating assets like taxis.  About 30 percent 
of respondents experienced a substantial eco-
nomic impact as a result of the financial awards 
they received from the Commission. 
 When respondents purchased depre-
ciating assets, paid for improvements to their 
homes that would not necessarily increase 
their value, paid off debt, or kept the money in 
low-interest-bearing accounts, this qualified as 
a moderate economic impact.  About 33 per-
cent of respondents experienced a moderate 
economic impact.  The data are limited so for 
respondents in this category it is possible that 
the financial award resulted in a long-term eco-
nomic benefit, but it is also possible that it did 
not.  For example, most people did not report 
what type of debt they paid off, so it is possible 
that this debt was acquired to make value-
increasing home improvements or to purchase 
depreciating assets, such as cell phones, which 
allowed these claimants to search for or secure  
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employment more effectively.  It is also possible 
that respondents used the restitution money 
to pay off debt and as a consequence later had 
money available to complete value-increasing 
home improvements.  The data’s limitations 
make it difficult to determine whether the 
financial awards given to respondents in the 
moderate economic impact category led to 
increases in net assets.  
 When respondents spent their money 
on things that would not have a lasting eco-
nomic impact, I labeled this a low economic 
impact.  This category includes, for example, 
expenditures on food and other necessities 
of daily living, luxury goods, travel, and cultural 
investments such as tombstones.  Although one 
dominant view among Commission officials was 
that financial compensation had absolutely no 
sustained economic effect for the overwhelming 
majority of claimants, surprisingly only about 30 
percent of the respondents fell into this catego-
ry.  
 Studies that explore consumption theory 
have found that larger financial awards are likely 
to increase recipients’ net assets while smaller 
awards are likely to be consumed with no long-
term economic benefit. 57   This study’s findings 
are consistent with this observation.  Table 4 
shows that the average amount received by 
respondents in the substantial economic impact 
category was significantly higher than the aver-
age for the moderate economic impact cate-
gory, which was in turn higher than the average 
for the low economic impact category.58   
 Also, the data show a statistically signifi-
cant positive correlation between the size of 
the award and an increase in net assets.  The 
more interesting story that prior studies ex-
ploring consumption theory do not develop 
is how and why larger financial awards lead to 
an increase in recipients’ net assets.  To explore 
this, I will contrast respondents whose finan-
cial awards had a substantial economic impact 
with those whose awards had a low economic 
impact because the differences are most clear 
at the extremes.  
Table 4
Frequency Percent Median restitution 
award
Mean restitution 
award
Substantial Impact 24 30% 28,335 127,274
Moderate Impact 26 33% 20,000 48,761
Low Impact 30 38% 15,000 23,399
Total 80 100 22,669* 66,478
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1.  Financial compensation had a substantial eco-
nomic impact
When financial awards had a substantial economic impact, 
it was primarily because the awards were large enough to 
allow recipients to complete home remodeling projects. 
Smaller financial awards increased net assets when respon-
dents: (1) had the financial wherewithal to combine the 
awards with their own money, (2) completed only minor 
renovations, or (3) completed substantial renovations in a 
piecemeal fashion over longer spans of time.  
The general trend
 A financial award could have a substantial economic impact in several ways including: in-
creasing the value of an existing asset (for example, by completing a home improvement project); 
increasing an individual’s human capital and thus her capacity to earn money in the future (through 
job training courses, tertiary education, or the like); allowing for investment in a long-term, high-yield 
savings instrument (such as a three-year certificate of deposit); or funding investment in a small busi-
ness (such as a street-side vending enterprise).  Despite the array of available options, almost all of 
the respondents whose financial compensation had a substantial economic impact spent the money 
on renovating their homes, thereby increasing the value of their primary assets.59   
 A representative story was that of Mrs. Moore, who received about R 25,000 (approximately 
$ 3,571) from the Commission.  She proudly reported that “we improved the house; made our-
selves more comfortable.  We built a carport, so on, you know.  We did the bathroom, the toilet, 
made it more attractive so that when we sold that house we got a very good price to what we 
bought that house for.”60   Respondents made a wide range of improvements to their homes, but 
most commonly they purchased new roofs, extended their homes, installed new ceilings, added  
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security features, or plastered the walls.  
 The amount of compensation people 
received affected the scale of their renovations 
and hence the monetary value they added 
to their homes.  People who received smaller 
sums were only able to make modest renova-
tions that in turn only modestly increased the 
value of their homes.  The experience of Mrs. 
Majola—a pensioner who was evicted from 
Paarl, a mixed-raced community in the West-
ern Cape—was representative.  She said, “[T]
hat R 25,000 I spent it trying to extend my 
father’s house.  But that house is not complete.  
It’s because the money is too small. I do say I 
was happy to get R 25,000 because my father’s 
house is rebuilt because we had now three 
rooms there.  And they were not done, these 
houses.  It was only three rooms, but if you can 
go there now, you’ll find it’s a little bigger.  It’s 
still going up to a great house, but I haven’t got 
any more wings to fly.”61   
 In contrast, respondents who received 
larger sums, and thus had the resources “to fly”, 
were able to remodel their homes and substan-
tially increase the homes’ value.  Mr. Jones com-
pleted significant renovations with the R 48,000 
(approximately $ 6,857) award he received 
from the Commission for a large property that 
his father had owned in a community called 
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Steurhof.  “I renovated my front here, made a 
little sunroom you know.  And then I built on a 
workroom for my wife. She does cake decorat-
ing and things like that.  So it’s a little workroom 
for her, and then I enclosed the back stoop.”62   
A brother and sister who each received R 
28,000 (approximately $ 3,500) for the home 
their family was evicted from in Kilnerton 
combined their financial awards to significantly 
remodel the home they both live in as well as 
their grandmother’s home.  
Brother: Just it [the renovation] had 
enlightened everything. The house 
looked gloomy. It looked like an old 
house. So after renovation it looks 
bright.  
Sister: And of course up till today ev-
eryone says “Oh! This house is good” 
not knowing just this is [laughing] a 
facelift. 63 
Mrs. Mpho, a pensioner who lives in Soweto, 
received R 142,450 (approximately $ 20,350) 
for a large piece of land her father owned in a 
community called Evaton.  With this relatively 
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large sum she was able to make substantial 
renovations that brought immediate profit.  “I 
used the money to improve the house, pay rent, 
and buy food.  I’m alright now.  I fixed the house 
outside and built three rooms outside that I am 
renting.  I am in the house and eat well.  I buy 
bread and food until my death approaches.  It 
was hard before I got the compensation, but 
now as long as I have milk and pap, I am okay.”64  
 The evidence is consistent; people in the 
substantial economic impact category spent 
their financial awards primarily on home im-
provements.  But, the more interesting question 
is why they made this choice.  For many people, 
the economic benefit of renovating their homes 
was not what motivated them to do it.  Instead, 
the home improvements served as a memo-
rial to their parents and other family members 
who were devastated by the evictions but did 
not live long enough to receive compensation 
from the post-apartheid government.  Mr. Kag-
iso, a young, passionate man, was only two years 
old when his family was brutally evicted from 
Simonstown, a seaside community of Africans in 
the Western Cape.  He said, “I did nothing for 
myself. Nothing at all for myself.  I didn’t even 
buy a car for myself.  You see, I was just try-
ing, according to my pride, I was just trying to 
change the shape of my mother’s house.”65  
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 Mrs. Reed, like Mr. Kagiso and many other 
respondents in the substantial economic impact 
category, was determined to use the money 
in a way that honored her family: “I thought of 
my grandparents, and my father was also hard 
working. And he, each time three o’clock he 
must get up, me and my other sister then go to 
the market selling greens.  He was hardwork-
ing, and my grandfather also.  So I say I can’t go 
roam with this money.  I can’t go buy material 
things for the house or something like a couch. 
I needed something like a business.”66   Mrs. 
Reed used her financial award to make home 
improvements and purchase a taxi because she 
wanted to memorialize her father and grand-
father who lost so much but did not live long 
enough to experience the sweet taste of justice. 
“I thought of my grandparents, and my 
father was also hard working. And he, 
each time three o’clock he must get up, 
me and my other sister then go to the 
market selling greens.  He was hard-
working, and my grandfather also.  So 
I say I can’t go roam with this money.  
I can’t go buy material things for the 
house or something like a couch. I 
needed something like a business.”
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Exceptions to the general 
trend
 Although the general pattern is that 
larger awards lead to an increase in net assets, 
there are a few cases in my sample in which 
small financial awards led to increases in net 
assets.  More specifically, only 16 percent of the 
people who received awards amounting to less 
than R 20,000 (approximately $ 2,857) expe-
rienced a substantial economic impact, but we 
can learn from these anomalous cases.  Mr. Wil-
son and Mr. Farley, for example, received small 
financial awards of R 2,000 (approximately  
$ 285) and R 3,000 (approximately $ 428), re-
spectively.  They both used the money to  
upgrade their homes and increase their net as-
sets. 67 One is a school principal and the other 
is a successful businessman, so they both had 
the financial resources to supplement their 
financial awards to complete their home im-
provements.  Mr. Farley said, “I used my money 
to fix something at my home.  I didn’t want to 
spend it on a party and so on, and when I’m 
looking at my roof I can say to myself that is 
part of the money I received from that time.”68   
Despite his determination to spend his money 
to memorialize his family’s loss, without addi-
tional financing, Mr. Farley would not have been 
able to upgrade his roof.  
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 Mrs. Mzi was also able to significantly 
increase her net assets with the R 11,000  
(approximately $ 1,571) she received; but, un-
like Mr. Farley and Mr. Wilson, she is a pensioner 
of limited means.  
Mrs. Mzi: I used the money for ex-
tending … It was still a small house. 
I made some two rooms in the back, 
and I finished the inside.  We did the 
walls, we painted down here, added 
the tiles.  I changed the light. 
Interviewer:  And was it [the financial 
award] enough to do all that?  Was it 
enough to put in those two rooms and 
the ceiling, tiles, and the walls?
Mrs. Mzi: No, not at all, but it gave me 
a start …  
For those of limited means, undertaking a reno-
vation was a piecemeal affair that stretched out 
over several years.  The renovations started at 
times of high liquidity and stopped when the 
money ran dry.   
 Others, like Mrs. Mzi, who were people 
of humble means, were able to use their mea-
ger financial awards to modestly increase their 
net assets by completing very limited reno-
vations, but over short periods of time.  Mr. 
Moseneke, for example, used his R 10,000 
(approximately $ 1,428) to tile his ceiling and 
plaster his walls, while Mr. Kagiso used his R 
11,000 to make a minor extension to his house. 
Mr. Kagiso said, “I just put some garage and 
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extended a little bit, not too much, from here 
to that window. Yes, that’s all, and the money get 
finished. It was a little money.”  
 In sum, when financial awards had a 
substantial economic impact, it was primar-
ily because the awards were large enough to 
allow each recipient to complete some type 
of home remodeling project.  But there were 
also cases in which smaller financial awards 
increased net assets because those respondents 
had the financial wherewithal to combine the 
awards with their own money to complete ma-
jor renovations, because they completed only 
minor renovations, or because they completed 
substantial renovations in a piecemeal fashion 
over longer spans of time.  Respondents’ most 
common motivation for renovating their homes 
was to honor those family members who were 
most affected by the dispossession but died be-
fore the post-apartheid government provided 
compensation.  Small financial awards given to 
claimants who were cash-strapped or did not 
own homes had little chance of having a sub-
stantial economic impact because respondents 
did not use the awards to, for instance, enroll 
in job-training classes that would improve their 
human capital or invest in high-yield, long-term 
savings instruments.  
27
2.  Financial compen-
sation had a low eco-
nomic impact
Respondents in the low 
economic impact category, 
on average, received small-
er financial awards then re-
spondents in the substantial 
economic impact category 
and tended to spend their 
awards on the needs of ev-
eryday living; on non-essen-
tials; or on cultural invest-
ments such as tombstones. 
Despite the size of the fi-
nancial award, it was likely to 
have a low economic impact 
when the pressure to imme-
diately consume the award 
was too great.
 Generally, the findings in this study are 
consistent with the conclusions of prior stud-
ies: those in the low economic impact category 
received smaller financial awards that were 
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consumed with no long-term economic bene-
fit.69   The average amount received by respon-
dents in this category was R 24,068 (approxi-
mately $ 3,438), about one-fifth of the average 
amount received by those whose financial 
awards led to a substantial economic impact 
(see Table 4).70   
Generally, the findings in this study are 
consistent with the conclusions of prior 
studies: those in the low economic im-
pact category received smaller finan-
cial awards that were consumed with 
no long-term economic benefit.
 The awards received by respondents in 
the low economic impact category were sys-
tematically less primarily because the Originally 
Dispossessed Individuals (ODIs) were dead 
and the Commission’s policy was to split these 
financial awards among all descendants of each 
deceased ODI according to the laws of intes-
tate succession.71   Mr. Yusef expressed a com-
mon frustration with the Commission’s decision 
to provide only symbolic (rather than market-
related) compensation and then to divide these 
small awards among descendants:
If they had given us, like, say, “Okay, 
this is prime [land] then we will give 
you R 400,000.”  Then you can divide 
it.  “Okay, like, if you are just a single 
person, then we will come down with 
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that amount.”  But don’t give nine 
people R 36,000, and the other one is 
just one particular, he gets the same 
as you, R 36,000.  I mean, look, it 
doesn’t make sense.  At least with R 
36,000 you can do something with it.  
You can buy yourself a nice car.  But 
with R 4,000 what can you do?72 
Mrs. Doe, who received R 5,000 (approximately 
$ 714), agreed with Mr. Yusef and perfectly 
articulated the frustration of others who also 
received small awards.  When she was asked if 
the money had changed her life in any way, she 
responded with great ire, “It was too little to 
change my mind.  This little bit of money, oh my 
goodness. R 5,000—eish! It’s so little.”73   
The general trend
 Three distinct patterns emerged in the 
way respondents in the low economic impact 
category spent their financial awards.  They con-
sistently spent it on the needs of everyday living, 
on non-essentials, or on cultural investments 
such as tombstones.  
“I just spent it [the financial award] 
in the house whenever I run short, you 
know. I’m a pensioner, and, you know, 
sometimes, sometimes I run short, you 
go fetch a little bit of that money and 
use it in the house.”
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 The first trend the interview data reveal 
is that people in the low economic impact cat-
egory spent the award on daily survival, which 
most commonly included expenditures on food 
and other basic household items.  Mr. Colbert’s 
experience was representative.  He received 
R 16,000 (approximately $ 2,285) and said, “I 
just spent it [the financial award] in the house 
whenever I run short, you know. I’m a pension-
er, and, you know, sometimes, sometimes I run 
short, you go fetch a little bit of that money and 
use it in the house.”74   Like many others, with 
her small award of R 2,000 (approximately  
$ 285), Mrs. Jameson bought “just the house-
hold stuff, food [laughs] and something I want 
to, stuff that I couldn’t afford to use.  I couldn’t 
afford to use my pension on that, so that some-
thing extra helped me to buy something.”  The 
Ntombena sisters, who were so close that they 
frequently finished each other’s sentences dur-
ing the interview, each received about R 22,000 
(approximately $ 3,142) and spent it on food 
and other household items as well.  “We bought 
curtaining [said in unison].  I bought curtaining 
[laughs], and a few bedding things, that’s all.  And 
food. Most of it went on food because food 
is so expensive nowadays.  You go into a shop 
now and spend more than R 4,000 for grocer-
ies.” 75  This first trend shows that people used 
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their financial awards to create an economic 
buffer that ensured they were living comfort-
ably above their survival point rather than 
below it.  
 The second trend the study reveals is 
that people in the low economic impact cat-
egory often spent their financial awards on 
non-essentials.  Mr. Smidt’s story was represen-
tative.  His deceased grandfather was evicted 
under the Group Areas Act, and Mr. Smidt and 
his three brothers had to share his deceased 
father’s portion of the award. He stressed that 
his share was so small that there was no chance 
that it could have an enduring financial benefit. 
“But when I got the R 800 and to me it was a 
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waste of time.  I had it in my pocket, and within 
a second it was gone.  I thought I would give it 
to my mum, but when I got the money it was 
all gone [laughing].  Actually, that little I got, I 
couldn’t do something with it.”76   Mrs. Valley is 
a thirty-something legal secretary who received 
about R 3,200 (approximately $ 457), which 
was her deceased mother’s share of a finan-
cial award.77   Mrs. Valley spent her R 3,200 on 
CDs and a new refrigerator.  “So I enjoyed that 
[financial award].  I spent it on nonsense actu-
ally [laughing].  It [the fridge] was just very old, 
and it was, like, making noises at night [laugh-
ing].” 78  Mr. Rathod, a retired entrepreneur, took 
his wife on a trip to the casino with his R 7,500 
(approximately $ 1,071).79   Respondents who 
received small awards consistently spent them 
on non-essentials primarily because there was 
very little else respondents could imagine do-
ing with such small sums.  Investments in home 
improvements, long-term financial instruments, 
or small business required more money than 
they had, while investments in job training and 
other self improvement ventures required more 
imagination than same had.
 Even when the Commission distributed 
slightly larger financial awards to people in 
the upper class, they often still spent them on 
non-essentials.  Prior studies suggest that the 
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size of an award is the primary variable that 
determines whether it is consumed or used to 
increase a recipient’s asset base.80   The data in 
this study suggest, however, that the percent-
age of the respondent’s income that the award 
represents is also an important factor worthy 
of further exploration.  There were significantly 
more upper-class people in the low economic 
impact category than there were in the sub-
stantial impact category.81   The experience of 
Mr. and Mrs. Lerato provides insight into this 
observation.
 The Leratos were a sweet old African 
couple who, after over sixty years of marriage, 
endearingly referred to each other as “my old 
lady” and “my man.”82   They were retired teach-
ers who had built an impressively furnished 
home with custom ceilings in a Pretoria town-
ship called Mamelodi.  Since their home was 
already upgraded and they were living comfort-
ably, they used the R 57,000 (approximately $ 
8,142) they received on “this and that.” 83   They 
explained to me that the money did not change 
anything for them, but it might have made a 
difference for people who were struggling.84   
Similarly, Mr. Kane was a retired insurance sales-
man with a comfortable lifestyle.  He received 
R 25,580 (approximately $ 3,654) and empha-
sized that he “used the money to enjoy life.”85   
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“I saved it and then I went on a trip to 
Australia, but I didn’t take all the [res-
titution] money.  I took from my own 
money also … We are going to Austra-
lia again and New Zealand, and there’s 
no restitution money.”
 Other financially well-positioned respon-
dents combined their own money with the 
financial awards to take trips.  Mr. Budlender 
went to Australia with his financial award of R 
26,800 (approximately $ 3,828).  “I had money 
already; I mean it’s saving and working hard and 
knowing how to turn around your money.  I 
saved it and then I went on a trip to Australia, 
but I didn’t take all the [restitution] money.  I 
took from my own money also … We are go-
ing to Australia again and New Zealand, and 
there’s no restitution money.”86  Mr. Jain, a suc-
cessful entrepreneur, used his financial award of  
R 30,000 (approximately $ 4,285) to take one 
of his several trips to Mecca.  Likewise, Mrs. 
Smith—a well-off Coloured woman whose 
family emigrated to Australia during the apart-
heid years—received an award of R 85,000 
(approximately $ 12,142) and used the money 
to finance a vacation back to South Africa.  In 
sum, people who received small financial awards 
often spent them on non-essentials because 
there is little else they could imagine doing with 
the money.  Upper-class people who received 
larger awards also spent them on non-essentials 
because the awards were small in relation to 
their overall wealth and thus viewed as extra 
money to play with.  
 The third trend my analysis shows is 
that making an economic investment was not 
a priority for respondents in the low economic 
impact category.  Instead, they were more 
concerned with making cultural investments 
through the purchase of tombstones.  Interest-
ingly, people in all categories—substantial, mod-
erate, and low economic impact—purchased 
tombstones.  But, while respondents in the sub-
stantial economic impact category usually used 
their financial awards to make home improve-
ments and purchase tombstones, respondents 
in the low economic impact category often had 
only enough financing to buy the tombstones, 
foregoing home improvements and the like.87   
  Mrs. and Mr. Sibanda, the brother-sister 
duo, explained the importance of a tombstone.  
Mr. Sibanda said that its purpose was “to be 
remembered by all.”88  The sister chimed in and 
added that “it’s for us to get our great-great-
great-great-grandchildren to know where their 
great-great-great-grandfather or grandmother 
is.  That’s the meaning for a tombstone for us.”89  
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Mr. Lesedi offered another view of the impor-
tance of tombstones: “You know, you never 
really live comfortably in your life after your 
parents have died and there’s no remembrance. 
A tombstone is a … it’s a symbolic gesture to 
say we thank you for having brought us into this 
world, number one.  And secondly we cannot 
afford to forget you, and thirdly that each time 
obviously when there’s no tombstone the grave 
perpetually becomes … it’s neglected.”90   
“I think all of us here in South Africa, 
putting a tombstone on your mother’s 
or in your sister’s grave, it is something 
very big. It is like you paying your re-
spects; you are saying, ‘I am building a 
house for you as I am staying in the 
house.’”
 Many of the owners and occupants who 
were evicted during apartheid died before they 
were able to see the day when the new demo-
cratically elected government would provide 
compensation for the atrocious injustices ex-
ecuted by the previous governments.   
Mrs. Ngcobo insisted that erecting tombstones 
was a way to replace the houses the deceased 
lost by building them homes in their final rest-
ing places.  She said that, “I think all of us here 
in South Africa, putting a tombstone on your 
mother’s or in your sister’s grave, it is something 
very big. It is like you paying your respects; you 
are saying, ‘I am building a house for you as I am 
staying in the house.’”91   Mrs. Nthabi echoed 
a similar sentiment when she said that “I even 
told my sister that if they gave me this money 
I’m gonna make a tombstone for my parents 
… I won’t enjoy it and I don’t want to enjoy it 
because it’s for my parents, I must do it for my 
parents so that they can sleep well.”  
 In sum, the dominant patterns are that 
respondents in the low economic impact cat-
egory spent their financial awards on the needs 
of everyday living; on non-essentials; or on 
tombstones.  In addition to these three pat-
terns, the data also reveal a fourth trend, an 
interesting correlation between a respondent’s 
age and how she or he spent the money.  Since 
older people have larger portions of their lives 
behind them than ahead of them, one might 
hypothesize that this group would not be so 
concerned with the long-term economic ben-
efit of their financial awards.  The data support 
this hypothesis, and the experience of the Maru 
family is illustrative. 
 Mr. Maru submitted a claim on behalf of 
his aged, ailing mother, who used the money 
for her immediate medical needs.  He said, 
“My mother was still alive at that time.  So we, 
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we decided whatever the money, when the R 
40,000 came, it went straight to her. She did, 
eish, she, it did help her because she had a 
medical problem.  She had a stroke, and then it 
helped to pay for her medical.  She was here [at 
home] for two and a half years, bedridden, so 
we had to get the specialized beds and things.”92 
Like many other older claimants, Mrs. Maru’s 
priority was not to make a long-term economic 
investment; because she was approaching the 
end of her life, satisfying her immediate needs 
was paramount.93   
Exceptions to the general 
trend
 As revealed in prior studies, those in the 
low economic impact category received smaller 
financial awards that were consumed with no 
long-term impact.  There were four cases in the 
study, however, in which respondents received 
larger awards but nevertheless experienced a 
low economic impact. In three of these cases, 
the respondents received sizable awards but 
decided to make hefty cultural investments 
through the purchase of several tombstones.  
Mrs. Madala received a large award of about R 
113,000 (approximately $ 16,142) as compen-
sation for the eviction of her husband’s parents, 
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so her priority was to build tombstones for her 
husband and in-laws.  “I just said, ‘This is my hus-
band’s parent’s money.’  And I took that money 
and, I’m telling my true story, I took that money 
and made tombstones for them.  Yes, because 
it was their money.”94   Mrs. Madala is a pen-
sioner with a beautiful home in the township 
of Mamelodi, which had already been extended 
and upgraded.  She lived comfortably, and her 
children are grown and successful, and also 
have their own houses.  Usually a person in her 
situation is likely to spend the award on non-
essentials, but since she deeply believed that the 
money rightfully belonged to her in-laws and 
husband, she spent the money to benefit them.  
 The last case involved the Goodes, a 
Coloured family from Kliptown, a small town 
near Soweto, Johannesburg.  The apartheid 
government stole fourteen properties from 
Wayne Goode; and as part of the land restitu-
tion process, the Commission made an attempt 
to “wipe their tears” by giving the family R 
840,000 (approximately $ 120,000) in com-
pensation.  Mr. Goode’s daughter talked about 
how a humble Coloured chauffeur was able to 
acquire fourteen properties during apartheid:
When he used to come home week-
ends then he’ll start building, improv-
ing himself.  I suppose he wanted to 
leave work; he was a chauffeur where 
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he worked, and Saturdays and Sun-
days he used to be busy building, 
and then when one room is finished 
he would hire it out.  He had nobody 
else to help; he was also earning a 
small wage.  That is how he built from 
room to room and then have enough 
and buy another place and then go on 
building.  He was a very hard worker.  
He never drank or smoked; he was 
just a hard worker.95   
 The apartheid government ruthlessly 
took away everything Mr. Goode had worked 
tirelessly to acquire and paid him a farthing.  
Inexplicably, one year after Kliptown was de-
clared a white area and Mr. Goode and all other 
Coloureds were callously removed, the apart-
heid government reclassified it a Coloured area; 
but, in a particularly cruel move, the apartheid 
government did not return the expropriated 
houses to their original owners.  After this 
heartbreaking experience, Mr. Goode and his 
wife moved to Lesotho because he could not 
countenance being evicted once again.  He 
died in Lesotho a bitter man.  The government 
moved the rest of his family to Protea, another 
township just outside of Johannesburg, and after 
they had once again established themselves, the 
apartheid government again evicted them and 
forced them to move to El Dorado Park, where 
they lived at the time of the study. I interviewed 
Mr. Goode’s granddaughters, Mrs. Reed and 
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Mrs. Douglass, who each received a financial 
award of R 65,000 (approximately $ 9,285) 
and his daughter, Mrs. Gains, who received R 
210,000 (approximately $ 30,000).  
 In accordance with evidence in prior 
studies, the relatively large financial award in-
creased Mrs. Reed’s net assets; she used the 
money to upgrade her home and purchase a 
taxi.  In contrast, the sizable financial award did 
not significantly improve the net assets of Mrs. 
Douglass or Mrs. Gains.  All three women were 
from the same family, were not educated be-
yond standard five, and were either divorced 
or widowed and so did not have husbands to 
rely on.  Given their similarities, why the differ-
ent outcomes?  Their stories bring to light an 
important observation: the financial needs of 
those economically dependent on the respon-
dent played a large role in how the compensa-
tion was used.  
 Mrs. Douglass and Mrs. Gains used the 
bulk of their money on their financially de-
pendent adult children.  Mrs. Douglass’ only 
daughter had been ill for some time (and was 
deceased at the time of the interview); Mrs. 
Douglass used part of her money to pay for 
her grandson’s private secondary school tuition 
and to pay for the upkeep of the home where 
they were residing.  She said, “Isn’t it, I was feel-
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ing sorry because at the time she wasn’t feeling 
well.  I had to help her with the child to keep 
in school.  If I didn’t pop out money, the child 
wouldn’t make it to school. I don’t know if what 
is gonna happen to the child.” 96   Likewise, Mrs. 
Gains explained that she used her money to 
support her unemployed children and grand-
children:
Here I’m sitting with nothing.  Maybe 
it is my fault.  Maybe I was too lenient 
with the children, feeling sorry for 
them because your children you bor-
row them, you never get it back.  A 
person you must not concentrate on 
the children because your children can 
sometimes be your enemies. I’ve got 
grandchildren, big children, the one 
says, “Mommy, borrow me this,” so 
you give there and you end up with 
nothing.  I can’t say the one son  
borrows, “Mommy, I’ll give you,” and 
the other son also borrows, and the 
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children don’t give you back what they 
take from you.  So now I’m really living 
on my pension. What can I do if they 
don’t give?  And besides they’re not 
working.97 
 In contrast, Mrs. Reed’s three daughters 
were economically self-sufficient individuals 
who were waitressing in America and London 
to make money.  Mrs. Reed combined her 
financial award with her daughters’ earnings 
and purchased their first taxi.  After continually 
reinvesting their profits, they built a thriving en-
terprise of five taxis.  The lesson is that, despite 
the size of the financial award, if the recipient 
is unemployed and the sole breadwinner for a 
large group of destitute and dependent people, 
then the award is not likely to increase her net 
assets because the pressure to immediately 
consume the award is too great.
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POLICY  
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the impracticality of limiting equitable redress to land 
restitution, the Commission must take steps to ensure that 
financial awards produce enduring economic benefits.  The 
Commission can accomplish this by increasing both the im-
pact of smaller financial awards and the size of the awards 
generally.
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 In its early years, the Commission fo-
cused on distributing financial awards.  The 
Commission has changed gears and is now 
de-emphasizing the financial compensation 
option and emphasizing land restitution partly 
because its dominant institutional belief is that, 
overall, financial compensation had absolutely 
no long-term economic benefit for recipients.  
This study suggests that this assumption is false; 
in fact there was a sustainable economic impact 
in about one-third of the cases in the sample.  
Nevertheless, based on its questionable con-
clusion, the Commission has now indirectly 
taken the financial compensation option away 
from the remaining claimants (who are mostly 
claiming rural lands) and is persuading them to 
choose land restitution. 
 The Commissioner for the Eastern Cape 
described how the financial compensation op-
tion has been de-emphasized: “The Act gives 
the option of cash, so people don’t want devel-
opment; but, if you minimize the financial and 
accentuate development, the community goes 
along.”98   A project officer from the Western 
Cape shared his personal experience with the 
Commission’s post-2007 policy of de-emphasiz-
ing the financial compensation option:
Now we don’t encourage it [financial 
compensation].  But before in the 
options workshop we presented all 
options comprehensively; but we real-
ized people want quick cash, so we 
now present development compre-
hensively.  When we talk about finan-
cial compensation, we run quickly 
through it because the same people 
who have been settled come back to 
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seek land via other programs.  This is 
why we are pushing development.99
 Another method the Commission has 
used to discourage claimants from choosing 
financial compensation is making the financial 
awards small.  A deputy director at the Com-
mission said, “We need to give low amounts so 
people choose land.  In Wallmansthal [a rural 
land claim located near Johannesburg], financial 
compensation is R 20,000, so many are not 
choosing it. I think we should be able to force 
claimants to choose land.”100   The director gen-
eral confirmed that, by official policy, “financial 
compensation is less in value than land, and this 
is done to discourage people from taking finan-
cial compensation. This is in line with practice in 
Germany and Estonia.”101   
But it does not make sense to limit 
claimants’ choices to land transfer when 
bureaucratic incapacity has drastically 
reduced the value of this option.  
 Because it is working on the assump-
tion that financial compensation had absolutely 
no enduring economic effect for recipients, the 
Commission’s strategy with the remaining claims 
is to transfer land to communities and de-em-
phasize the financial compensation option.  But 
it does not make sense to limit claimants’ choic-
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es to land transfer when bureaucratic incapacity 
has drastically reduced the value of this option.  
The available evidence suggests that the Com-
mission’s attempts to transfer land to claimants 
have failed on several counts.  
 First, transferring land to individuals and 
communities takes the Commission an ex-
tremely long time.  Tragically, while beneficiaries 
wait for the Commission to produce results, the 
people most affected by the evictions (ODIs) 
are dying; people are losing faith in the process 
and becoming disillusioned; and land prices are 
steadily rising, which decreases the amount of 
land the Commission can purchase given its 
limited budget.102   
 Second, even when the Commission has 
transferred land to communities, ensuring that 
the community is able to use the land effec-
tively has posed a serious challenge.  There are 
numerous reports of communities receiving 
agricultural land and not having the resources 
to develop it or to continue existing farming 
operations; additionally, in some instances weak 
governance structures have caused community 
disputes to proliferate.103   Consequently, there 
are several cases in which the land that com-
munities have received from the Commission is 
lying fallow or is underused.104   
 This shortcoming is not completely the 
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Commission’s fault because its original political 
mandate extended only to determining and dis-
tributing equitable redress, but it has found that 
once it transfers land to claimants, they require 
significant post-settlement support.105   The 
Commission does not have the organizational 
competence to provide these services; however, 
the Department of Agriculture does.106   De-
spite its supposed expertise, many of the farms 
the Department of Agriculture has transferred 
to beneficiaries are also failing.107  Since the 
state has proven it has limited capacity to trans-
fer land, then it must find ways to make financial 
compensation more effective, instead of remov-
ing it as an option altogether.  To do this, I argue 
that the Commission should increase the eco-
nomic impact of smaller awards and increase 
the amount of financial awards.
1. Increase the eco-
nomic impact of small-
er financial awards
The Commission should 
create various types of fi-
nancial awards and provide 
incentives for claimants to 
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make choices that result in 
an enduring economic ben-
efit.  The Commission should 
also provide financial coun-
selors who ensure claim-
ants are aware of all of their 
choices.
 Forcing people to choose land restitution 
is not the correct policy direction, but giving 
people meaningful choices is.  In a prior article, 
I argued that when dispossession is part of a 
larger strategy of dehumanization, it involves 
more than just the confiscation of an individual 
or community’s property; it involves an attempt 
to confiscate people’s humanity and remove 
them from the social contract.108   This leads to 
what I call property-induced invisibility. 109   I argue 
that in the face of property-induced invisibility, 
the state’s task is not just to compensate the 
dispossessed for past property violations, but to 
do it in a way that reintegrates them into the 
social contract and makes them visible.  That 
is, the state’s responsibility is to restore dispos-
sessed individuals and communities to their 
rightful place in the polity.  
 “Reparations is the return of property 
that does not emphasize rebuilding a relation-
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sion to maintain the financial compensation 
option and also distribute vouchers in lieu of 
cash to ensure that financial awards systemati-
cally have a long-term economic impact.  For 
example, if the Commission wants to promote 
home improvements, a person entitled to a 
R 20,000 financial award should also have the 
option of instead receiving a R 30,000 voucher 
to purchase building materials from a home 
improvement store that has partnered with 
the Commission. Likewise, if the Commission 
wants to encourage beneficiaries to use their 
financial awards to improve their human capital, 
then it could offer a 25 percent increase in the 
financial awards when they are used to make 
payments directly to qualifying educational insti-
tutions.  The key is to give beneficiaries choice 
and to incentivize (not force) them to use their 
financial awards such that they have a lasting 
economic impact.112   
Although choice is essential to a mean-
ingful and successful land reform 
process, the Commission is intent on 
reducing the available choices by elimi-
nating the financial compensation op-
tion. 
 To increase the likelihood that financial 
awards (especially smaller ones) have an endur-
ship to society, while restoration is the return of 
property that emphasizes rebuilding a relation-
ship to society through asset-based choices.”110   
Restoration is about giving the dispossessed a 
choice as to how they are compensated and 
allowing them to decide the terms of their 
inclusion into the social contract.111   The Com-
mission could allow the individuals or commu-
nities that were wrongfully evicted to choose 
from these options: the return of their land; the 
receipt of alternative land (if their original land is 
no longer available); financial compensation; or a 
series of in-kind benefits.  In-kind benefits could 
include, for instance, free higher education for 
five family members, subsidized access to credit, 
or priority in an already established housing 
program.  
Reparations is the return of property 
that does not emphasize rebuilding a 
relationship to society, while restoration 
is the return of property that empha-
sizes rebuilding a relationship to society 
through asset-based choices.
Although choice is essential to a meaningful and 
successful land reform process, the Commission 
is intent on reducing the available choices by 
eliminating the financial compensation option.  
The superior policy choice is for the Commis-
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ing economic impact, the Commission should 
provide a financial counseling session for each 
financial award recipient.  Financial advisors 
would give a comprehensive description of 
the various kinds of financial awards and assist 
claimants in planning how to spend the award. 
Tozi Gwanya, the director general of land affairs, 
agrees with this approach.  
We should have provided financial ad-
vice on how to spend the compensa-
tion like they do when you win the lot-
tery.  This did not happen because of 
the weakness of officials.  This should 
happen in the options workshop.  We 
did force beneficiaries to open bank 
accounts to get the money, but Absa 
[a major South African bank] did not 
do what they were asked; the banker 
was supposed to provide financial ad-
vice.  The weakness is that the bank 
sells their products and not broader 
financial instruments.113   
 While the choice-centered approach I 
propose is strong, it is far from perfect.  There 
are three primary challenges:  First, it demands 
a highly efficient, noncorrupt bureaucracy that is 
able to determine the available choices.114   The 
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Commission may not be up to the challenge.  
Second, the choices must have wide appeal 
because a choice between highly undesirable 
options is no choice at all.  The process of 
determining the available options has the po-
tential to occur in a top-down manner; but the 
options will not have wide appeal if claimants 
are not involved in crafting them.  Consequently, 
it is extremely important that the Commission 
ensures that claimants are meaningfully involved 
from the beginning in crafting the available op-
tions.  
 Third, and most important, providing a 
creative range of choices for claimants will not 
change the skewed land ownership patterns 
that have stymied South Africa’s democracy 
since its inception.  The fact that whites, who 
constitute less than 10 percent of the popula-
tion, now own over 82 percent of the arable 
land is a radical injustice, and the policy recom-
mendations suggested in this study do nothing 
to address this.115   This means that the other 
two prongs of the land reform process (land 
redistribution and tenure reform) must bear 
the full weight of correcting this severe imbal-
ance.116   But, this is okay because land restitu-
tion is unique.  It is the part of the land reform 
strategy that should be predicated on choice 
because some individuals and communities 
PAYING FOR THE PAST:  ADDRESSING PAST PROPERTY VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
whose land was stolen decades ago are no lon-
ger interested in land restitution because they 
now have other priorities.117   
2.   Increase the 
amount of financial 
awards
The Commission should 
increase the amount of fi-
nancial awards by ensuring 
it does not overpay current 
landowners so that it can 
use the savings to purchase 
more land for dispossessed 
populations.  The Commis-
sion should also increase 
the sum given to beneficial 
occupants to match what it 
gives dispossessed owners. 
Do not overpay current 
landowners
 This study confirms the observation 
that larger financial awards are more likely than 
smaller awards to have an enduring economic 
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impact.118   Consequently, it is important to 
explore ways in which the Commission can 
increase the amount of financial awards.  One 
way the Commission can do this is by paying 
current landowners just compensation rather 
than Fair Market Value (FMV).  
 According to the constitutional bargain 
made in 1994, whites—who, as a consequence 
of apartheid and colonial-era land theft, then 
owned 87 percent of the fertile agricultural 
land despite being only 10 percent of the popu-
lation—would get to keep the property in their 
possession, regardless of how it was acquired.  
In exchange, blacks received the promise of 
land reform.  If the ANC had not conceded to 
this seemingly unfair liberation bargain, then 
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white minority rule might not have ended 
without a blood-drenched civil war and without 
destroying the economy that the ANC would 
inherit.  But the bargain came at a high cost: it 
further reinforced existing structural inequalities 
among the races.  
 Whites immediately received the ben-
efits of the bargain because the democratic 
regime legitimated and constitutionally pro-
tected their property rights as soon as it came 
into existence.  Thus, if the government used 
its powers of eminent domain to take the land 
for redistribution, it would have to pay just 
compensation, which is a market-related calcu-
lation.119   In contrast, Africans have a constitu-
tional right to equitable redress, which in urban 
areas unfortunately has translated into a sym-
bolic financial award that has no relation to the 
past or current market value of the properties 
in question. In short, whites get market-related 
compensation, and Africans get symbolic com-
pensation.  As a result of this compensation-
based, structural inequality, from its inception in 
1995 to March 31, 2008, the Commission spent 
R 7.8 billion to acquire land (paid mostly to 
white farmers to acquire their land) and only  
R 4.9 billion to distribute financial compensation 
(paid primarily to dispossessed African commu-
nities and individuals).120   
As part of the constitutional bargain, 
the liberation parties nimbly negoti-
ated to have the state take FMV into 
account in addition to several other 
equity-enhancing factors when paying 
just compensation.  Nevertheless, my 
interviews with Commission officials 
revealed that when the Commission 
acquires land, it often pays the FMV 
without regard to the other equity-en-
hancing factors.
 Although whites must receive just com-
pensation when the state expropriates their 
property, the constitutional bargain ensured 
that the calculation of just compensation is not 
based on FMV alone.  According to section 
25(3) of the South African constitution,
the amount of the compensation and 
the time and manner of payment must 
be just and equitable, reflecting an 
equitable balance between the pub-
lic interest and the interests of those 
affected, having regard to all relevant 
circumstances, including the current 
use of the property; the history of the 
acquisition and use of the property; 
the market value of the property; the 
extent of direct state investment and 
subsidy in the acquisition and benefi-
cial capital improvement of the prop-
erty; and the purpose of the  
expropriation.121   
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As part of the constitutional bargain, the libera-
tion parties nimbly negotiated to have the state 
take FMV into account in addition to several 
other equity-enhancing factors when paying just 
compensation.122   Nevertheless, my interviews 
with Commission officials revealed that when 
the Commission acquires land, it often pays 
the FMV without regard to the other equity-
enhancing factors.  There are several reasons 
behind this phenomenon.  
 Negotiated land reform (that is, involving 
willing sellers and willing buyers) is the principal 
method of land acquisition.123   But it gives cur-
rent landowners a serious advantage in nego-
tiations because the supply of farms for sale is 
small, the demand is high for particular proper-
ties due to ancestral connections or proximity 
to established communities, and the transaction 
costs involved in rejecting landowners’ of-
fers and starting the process again are high as 
well.124   The landowners’ advantage is solidified 
by the poor negotiation skills of Commission 
officials (who are not trained in negotiation) 
and ineffective service providers who do not 
properly research the equity-enhancing factors 
of properties as part of the valuation pro-
cess.125   As a result, the Commission has paid at 
or above the market price for properties, and 
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the equity-enhancing factors negotiated by the 
liberation parties have been ignored.  The Com-
mission must reduce the substantial amount 
it is paying to white farmers by abiding by the 
constitution’s equity-enhancing factors found in 
Section 25(3) so that it can increase the mea-
ger financial awards it distributes.  
 The primary downside of taking into ac-
count the equity-enhancing factors is that doing 
so requires extensive research into the history 
of each plot of land and one researcher’s find-
ings can vary widely from another’s.  This un-
certainty leaves current owners unsure of their 
land’s worth and can hamper investment and 
trade.126  In addition, one primary reason that 
the Commission and the Land Claims Court 
have largely ignored the equity-enhancing fac-
tors is that they are extremely difficult to incor-
porate into a calculation that determines a plot 
of land’s value.127   If, for example, a researcher 
successfully outlines a property’s history, it is 
still not clear how this should impact its value; 
or if the apartheid state subsidized a property’s 
initial acquisition, it is not clear whether this 
should impact the current owner.  Despite the 
challenges, the equity enhancing factors are a 
key part of the liberation bargain that the Com-
mission cannot ignore.  If the Commission and 
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the Land Claims Court establish clear rules 
for enforcing the equity-enhancing factors and 
implement them consistently, then these chal-
lenges will diminish.  This, however, has yet to 
happen.  
Increase the financial 
awards beneficial occupants 
receive 
 Another way that the Commission can 
increase the minimum award size is to stop 
paying dispossessed owners more than dispos-
sessed tenants. In most provinces, dispossessed 
tenants received approximately R 25,000, while 
dispossessed owners received R 60,000 or 
more. 128   The only province that has never 
distinguished between dispossessed owners and 
tenants and has treated both equally is Gau-
teng, and as a result, the average financial award 
in Gauteng is higher than in other provinces 
like the Western Cape (see Table 2).  Gauteng 
stands alone because it did not comply with the 
legal advice that dispossessed owners were en-
titled to more compensation than dispossessed 
tenants because they had ostensibly lost more.  
Gauteng’s progressive policy was instituted 
by its early regional land claims commissioner, 
Blessing Mphela, who strongly believed that the 
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political objective of restitution—to eliminate 
the divisions of the past—was the most impor-
tant and overriding consideration.  He believed 
that treating dispossessed owners better than 
tenants reinforced the inequalities of the past.  
Another way that the Commission can 
increase the minimum award size is to 
stop paying dispossessed owners more 
than dispossessed tenants.
 During apartheid, an ownership disparity 
existed among nonwhites as part of apartheid’s 
racial hierarchy:  Africans were at the bottom, 
whites were at the top, and Coloureds and 
Asians occupied the liminal space between the 
two.129   The prohibition against African land 
ownership solidified their position at the bot-
tom of the racial hierarchy. 130  Coloureds and 
Indians had relatively more opportunities to 
own land, although they were also heavily en-
cumbered by restrictions on ownership.131   
 The Act, however, attempts to equalize 
these past ownership disparities, as its inclusive 
definition of right in land places everyone on 
equal footing.  “ ‘[R]ight in land’ means any right 
in land whether registered or unregistered, and 
may include the interest of a labour tenant and 
sharecropper, a customary law interest, the 
interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrange-
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ment and beneficial occupation for a continu-
ous period of not less than 10 years prior to 
the dispossession in question.”132   Under the 
Act, tenants who occupied their home for ten 
years or more prior to dispossession are ben-
eficial occupants, and in the interest of justice, 
the Act places them on equal footing with 
claimants who possess more formal registered 
rights.  
 But the Commission ignores the concept 
of beneficial occupation when it distributes 
financial compensation and treats everyone 
without a deed as a tenant.  In Paarl—which 
prior to the Group Areas Act was a mixed-race 
community in the Western Cape’s scenic wine 
country—initially owners were paid R 40,000 
while tenants were paid a mere R 25,000.133   
Since Africans could not own land in Paarl 
because of the discriminatory practices of the 
apartheid government, for reasons of equity it is 
important that the Commission pay beneficial 
occupants the same amount as owners.  Failing 
to do so simply reinforces the injustices com-
mitted by the apartheid government; but sadly 
the Commission has not treated beneficial 
occupants on equal footing with owners with 
registered rights.  If the Commission changes its 
policy and pays beneficial occupants the same 
amount as owners, then it will also successfully 
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increase the average award.  
 The downside of acknowledging benefi-
cial occupants is that it can already be a  
serious challenge to determine whether a claim 
of dispossession meets the statutory require-
ments and is valid. It may be asking too much 
to require the Commission, in addition to this, 
to determine whether the claimant lived on the 
property continuously for ten years or more 
prior to being evicted and thereby qualifies as 
a beneficial occupant.  Despite the difficulties, 
the Commission must change its insistence on 
giving former owners a higher financial award; 
ignoring the category of beneficial occupation is 
a policy that reinforces apartheid’s legacy in-
stead of dismantling it.  
 In sum, Mr. Nkwinti—who since the 
study’s completion has become the Minister 
for Rural Development and Land Reform—
—declared that “depending on the type of 
political choices we make, and the decisions 
we take now, the type of administrative actions 
we take, the processes, procedures and institu-
tions we put in place, will either bring about the 
desired social cohesion and development or 
will perpetuate the colonial-apartheid’s social 
fragmentation and under-development.” 134  The 
correct administrative action is for the Commis-
sion to reverse its policy of effectively remov-
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ing the financial compensation option.  Instead, 
the Commission should increase the economic 
impact of smaller financial awards by (1) allow-
ing claimants to choose between various forms 
of equitable redress, while providing incentives 
for claimants to choose the methods that will 
produce a long-term economic benefit, and 
(2) providing financial counseling to claimants 
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who elect to receive financial compensation.135   
The Commission should also increase the size 
of financial awards by (1) taking the equity-
enhancing factors into account and using the 
consequent savings to increase the financial 
awards for dispossessed populations, and (2) 
taking seriously the category of beneficial occu-
pation.
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CONCLUSION
The Commission has assumed that financial compensation 
did not contribute to economic development because the 
money has been spent and ostensibly people’s financial po-
sitions have not changed.  Based on this assumption, the 
Commission has, in practice, removed the financial com-
pensation option.  But, this study finds that financial awards 
produced enduring economic benefits for 30 percent of 
respondents so the Commission should rethink its policy 
choices in light of this new empirical evidence. 
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 South Africa’s Land Restitution Program 
is one of the boldest attempts made by a tran-
sitional nation to address past property viola-
tions.  By settling the majority of urban claims, 
the Commission has completed a herculean 
task and accomplished what many thought was 
impossible.  If, in its early days, the Commission 
had not focused on distributing financial awards 
instead of land restitution, then it would have 
accomplished much less because of the dif-
ficulties involved in land restitution.  Based on 
anecdotal information, however, Commission 
officials have concluded that financial compen-
sation did not have any long-term economic 
benefits and has failed to contribute to the na-
tion’s goal of economic transformation.  Using 
data from eighty semi-structured interviews of 
claimants who received financial compensation, 
this study’s findings contradict the Commission’s 
conclusion because financial compensation had 
a substantial economic impact for 30 percent of 
respondents.  
 Prior empirical studies that have ex-
plored the effects of financial awards and other 
windfall payments have concluded that larger 
payments result in an increase of net assets 
while smaller awards are consumed with no 
long-term impact.136   The results of this study 
are generally consistent with this conclusion, but 
there are several important additional observa-
tions:
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 First, respondents who received larger 
financial awards were generally able to increase 
their net assets through investments in their 
homes.  People who received smaller awards 
had to combine the awards with their own 
finances to complete substantial home improve-
ments; or complete less ambitious renova-
tions in a piecemeal fashion when funds were 
available; or undergo limited renovations that 
in turn only modestly increased the value of 
their homes.  The majority of respondents who 
renovated their homes were not motivated by 
the economic benefits, but rather they were 
trying to honor their family members who died 
before the post-apartheid state compensated 
them.  It was not likely that poor claimants who 
received small financial awards or who did not 
own homes would experience an enduring 
economic benefit because the Commission did 
not create opportunities for people to use the 
awards to improve their human capital by, for 
instance, taking classes.  
 Second, the majority of respondents 
whose financial awards did not produce a long-
term economic benefit either received small 
awards or awards that constituted only small 
percentages of their overall net worth.  In these 
cases, respondents often spent the money on 
daily survival or non-essentials.  Third, many 
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people were interested in making cultural rath-
er than economic investments.  People who re-
ceived larger financial awards were usually able 
to purchase tombstones and renovate their 
homes, whereas those who received smaller 
awards had enough financing only to purchase 
tombstones, but not to invest in their homes.  
 Fourth, given their limited remaining life 
span, older people had less interest in spend-
ing their financial awards in ways that would 
produce a long-term economic impact.  Lastly, 
the financial capacity of the respondents’ chil-
dren played a large role in how respondents 
used their compensation.  If the recipient was 
the sole breadwinner for a large group of un-
employed and economically dependent fam-
ily members, then the financial award was not 
likely to increase her net assets because the 
pressure to immediately consume the money in 
support of family members was too great.  
 To ensure that financial awards have an 
increased economic impact, this study suggests 
two policies.  First, the Commission should stop 
de-emphasizing the financial compensation 
option.  Instead, the Commission should make 
financial counselors available who will assist 
claimants in choosing between various types of 
financial awards including in-kind options.  The 
second policy suggestion addresses the fact 
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that the Commission is paying current land-
owners fair market value for their properties 
when the constitutional bargain mandates only 
just compensation, which can be a significantly 
lower amount.  The Commission should stop 
overpaying current landowners and instead use 
the savings to increase the minimum financial 
award.  Third, the Commission should increase 
the average financial award by paying beneficial 
occupants the same amount it pays those dis-
possessed owners who possessed more formal 
registered rights.  
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 The racially motivated evictions carried 
out under colonial and apartheid-era regimes 
severely violated the human rights of millions of 
South African citizens.  Families were economi-
cally hobbled, and invaluable social bonds were 
destroyed.  The tears of these families have 
wet the pages of history and made them heavy 
with despair ; and to its credit, the South African 
government has used financial compensation 
as one mechanism to try to wipe away these 
tears.  While its efforts to date have been noble, 
there is much work to be done.  
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Credit on the Seasonality of Household Expenditures, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1211 
(2000) (finding that EITC spending is more focused on durable rather than 
non durable goods.).
 22. Id.
See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMP-23. 
TION FUNCTION (1957).
 24. See Mordechai Kreinin, Windfall Income and Consumption—Additional 
Evidence, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1961).  See also Margaret Reid, 
Consumption, Savings and Windfall Gains, 52 Am. Econ. Rev. 728 (1962) 
(finding considerable support for Freidman’s permanent income hypothesis).  
But see Ronald Bodkin, Windfall Income and Consumption, 49 AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 602 (1959)(finding that there was a strong propen-
sity to spend windfall income); Roger Bird & Ronald Bodkin, The National 
Service Life Insurance Dividend of 1950 and Consumption: A Further Test of 
the ‘Strict’ Permanent Income Hypothesis, 73 J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 602 
(1965).
Michael Landsberger, 25. Windfall Income and Consumption: Comment, 
56 AMER. ECON. REV. 534 (1966) (finding that Israeli recipients of large 
restitution awards had a lower marginal propensity to consume than those 
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who received the smallest awards.).  For a more recent study that engages 
Landsberg’s work see Bertrand, Mullainathan & Shafir, Behavioral Econom-
ics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J. OF PUB-
LIC POL’Y & MKTG. 8, 15 (2006) (citing to Landsberger’s study of German 
restitution for Israelis and noting that “among the non poor, small (versus 
large) amounts are more likely to be spent than saved.”).
Id.  See also26.  Conrad Doenges, Transitory Income Size and Savings, 33 
SOUTHERN ECON. J. 258, 261-62 (1966) (“the tendency to save is stronger 
when the receipt is greater than $500, or greater than 4.0 per cent of gross 
income.  Alternatively, the tendency to consume is stronger when the receipt 
is less than $200, or less than 2.0 per cent of gross income.”); Abdel-
Ghany et. al, Windfall Income and the Permanent Income Hypothesis:  New 
Evidence 17 J. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 262, 273-74 (1983) (“The OLS 
instrumental variables analysis provide clear support for Friedman’s perma-
nent income hypothesis when the windfall income is small relative to regular 
income, the marginal propensity to consume windfall income is greater than 
the marginal propensity to consume regular income, thus rejecting Fried-
man’s permanent income hypothesis.”); Keeler, James & Abdel-Ghany, The 
Relative Size of Windfall Income and the Permanent Income Hypothesis, 3 
J. OF BUSINESS AND ECON. STATS. 209 (1985)(finding “[a] pattern of a 
declining marginal propensity to consume windfall income as the relative size 
of the windfall increases is apparent.”). 
As the field of consumption theory has developed over the years, more 27. 
recent studies using more advanced techniques have confirmed Fried-
man’s hypothesis as well.  See e.g. Christopher Carroll, A Theory of the 
Consumption Function, with and without Liquidity Constraints, 15 J. OF 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 23 (2001)(“It turns out that when there is meaningful 
uncertainty in future labor income, the optimal behavior of moderately impa-
tient consumers is much better described by Friedman’s original statement 
of the permanent income hypothesis than by the later explicit maximizing 
versions.”).
 If there were multiple people in one session telling the same story, I 28. 
counted this as one interview.  If there were two people in one session telling 
two separate stories, I counted this as two interviews.   
I have no reason to believe that the people for whom I was not able to 29. 
find a working phone number or for whom I was not able to reach are poorer 
or significantly different in other ways than the respondents in the study.
There are seven different Regional Land Claims Commissions (RL-30. 
CCs) that I could have sampled from:  Eastern Cape, Gauteng/Northwest, 
Western Cape, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Kwa-Zulu Natal and the Free State/
Northern Cape.  
See31.  Interview with Blessing Mphela, Chief Land Claims Comm’r, Dep’t 
of Rural Dev. & Land Reform, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (June 22, 2008).  Given the 
fact that the apartheid state did not allow the majority of blacks to become 
owners, Gauteng’s approach ensured that past imbalances and hierarchies 
were not resurrected through the restitution program. 
There is a correlation between respondents under 60 and being em-32. 
ployed.
The Commission does not have readily accessible information on the 33. 
age of restitution beneficiaries, so I could not compare the average age of 
the sample with that of the true population.  
Many of the ODIs in the sample were evicted from Simon’s Town, a 34. 
seaside town in the Western Cape, and are now living in a community called 
Luyolo located in the Cape Flats.  This is because Simon’s Town was a 
densely populated community with several families living on one plot of land; 
and instead of trying to establish the boundaries of each plot and who legiti-
mately resided there, the Commission decided that every person who was 
18 or older at the time of the eviction would be considered an ODI.  
For more about the apartheid-era racial categories 35. see generally 
CENSUS IN BRIEF, CENSUS 2001, STATISTICS S. AFR. (2001) 13 available 
at http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/CinBrief/CinBrief2001.pdf (last 
visited July 22, 2010); BILL ASHCROFT ET AL., POST-COLONIAL STUDIES: 
THE KEY CONCEPTS 14-15 (2000)(“Under the [Group Areas Act], people of 
African, Cape Colored or Indian descent were forcibly removed from urban 
areas where they had lived for generations.”).
There was a correlation between white respondents and being em-36. 
ployed.  Also, there was a negative correlation between white respondents 
and being a pensioner or in the 61-75 age bracket. 
One respondent explained that a father and his sons often owned the 37. 
property at the time of eviction so Indian women often did not have a right to 
make a claim.  “Respondent:  The six boys were the owners of the property, 
not the girls. The girls didn’t get anything.  Interviewer: Why was that?  
Respondent: That’s just the culture thing, you know what we do is when the 
girls are at home, you do everything for them. When they get married you 
give them everything [a dowry] and you send them off and that’s the end of 
it. That’s the culture thing.”  See confidential interview with a former resident 
of Marabastad, in the Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, 38. as amended by Act 48 of 
2003 §2 (S. Afr.).
See39.  DEP’T OF LAND AFFAIRS, S. AFR., WHITE PAPER ON SOUTH 
AFRICAN LAND POLICY S. 2.1 (1998)(stating the government has declared 
that freedom and agency are indispensable elements of the restorative 
process.).
From its inception to 2008, the Commission has settled 65,642 urban 40. 
claims:  73 percent financial compensation, 24 percent land restitution and 4 
percent other equitable remedy.  Supra note 8.
Initially, the Commission was suppose to finish its work and terminate in 41. 
2008.  Interview with Blessing Mphela supra note 31.
Claimants received R 40,000 for the first 600 square meters (sqm).  If 42. 
the property was between 600 to 1,800 sqm, then they received the prior 
amount plus an additional R 40 per sqm.  If the property was between 1801 
to 3000sqm, then claimants received the prior amount plus an additional R 
20 per sqm.  If the property was between 3001sqm to two hectares, then 
they received the prior amount plus an additional R 10 per sqm.  There is no 
additional compensation for properties in excess of two hectares.
Interview with Andile Shoko, Project Officer, Western Cape Regional 43. 
Land Claims Commission, in George, S. Afr. (Aug. 4, 2008).
Interview with Sonya Erasmus, Project Officer, Western Cape Regional 44. 
Land Claims Commission, in George, S. Afr. (Aug. 4, 2008).
Interview with Peter Piccolo, Senior Project Officer, Western Cape Re-45. 
gional Land Claims Commission, in George, S. Afr. (Aug. 4, 2008). 
Interview with Tozi Gwanya, Director General of Land Affairs, in Pretoria, 46. 
S. Afr. (Aug. 27, 2008).
 Interview with Sincede Masiza, Senior Project Officer, Western Cape 47. 
Regional Land Claims Commission, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 12, 2008). 
Interview with Beverly Jansen, Regional Commissioner, Western Cape 48. 
Regional Land Claims Commission, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 12, 2008). 
Interview with Willem Nero, Deputy Director, Western Cape Regional 49. 
Land Claims Commission, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 12, 2008).
See50.  Johan van Tooyen & Bongiwe Njobe-Mbuli, Access to Land: 
Selecting the Beneficiaries in AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: POLICIES, MARKET AND MECHANISMS 461(van Zyl eds. et al, 
1996) (“Land distribution in South Africa is highly skewed.  Approximately 87 
per cent of agricultural land is held by almost 67,000 white farmers and ac-
commodates a total population of 5.3 million.  The remaining 71 percent of 
the population, which is predominantly black, live on 13 per cent of the land 
in high density areas—the former homelands.”).  
Supra51.  note 18, at 9.
Interview with Ria de Vos, Director of Restitution Coordination and Sup-52. 
port, Central Land Claims Commission, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Mar. 4, 2008).
Interview with Peter Piccolo, 53. supra note 45.
Interview with Angela Conway, Executive Director, Southern Cape Land 54. 
Committee, in Goerge, S. Afr. (Aug. 6, 2008).
Interview with Blessing Mphela, 55. supra 31.
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Interview with Beverly Jansen, 56. supra note 48.
Supra57.  notes 23-27.
If the data of this study is consistent with the conclusions of prior 58. 
studies, then we should find that respondents who received larger restitu-
tion awards are less likely to be in the low economic impact category.  The 
data show that, on average, former owners received more than former 
tenants—R 105,650 and R 27,559 respectively (approximately $ 15,092 
and $ 3,937) —and only 26 percent of former owners are in the low eco-
nomic impact category as opposed to 47 percent of former tenants.  
Not everyone renovated their homes.  Two respondents were able to 59. 
purchase a new home with their restitution award.  Two sisters used the 
money to send a child to college.  Mrs. Reed and Mrs. Andile both pur-
chased taxis, which their sons drive to make a living.  Whether a respon-
dent improved their existing assets or acquired new assets, it is important 
to note the general welfare effects of all assets.  See MICHAEL SHER-
RADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR 148 (1991) (arguing that assets improve 
economic and household stability, create an orientation toward the future, 
stimulate development of human and other capital, enable people to focus 
and specialize, provide a foundation for risk-taking, yield personal social 
and political dividends, and enhance the welfare of offspring.).
See60.  confidential interview with a former resident of Kliptown, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
See61.  confidential interview with a former resident of Paarl, in the West-
ern Cape region, S. Afr. (2008).
See62.  confidential interview with former resident of Steurhof, in Cape 
Town, S. Afr. (2008).
See63.  confidential interview with former residents of Kilnerton, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
See 64. confidential interview with a former resident of Evaton, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
See65.  confidential interview with a former resident of Simon’s Town, in 
the Western Cape region, S. Afr. (2008).
See66.  confidential interview with a former resident of Kliptown, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
See67.  confidential interview with a former residents of Paarl, in the West-
ern Cape region, S. Afr. (2008).
Id.68. 
Supra69.  notes 23-27.
75 percent of the respondents in the low economic impact category 70. 
received a restitution award of R 40,000 (approximately $ 5, 714) or less.
See71.  TW BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 61-67 
(2004) (describing statutory intestate succession laws in South Africa.).
See72.  confidential interview with a former resident of District Six, in Cape 
Town, S. Afr. (2008).
See73.  confidential interview with a former resident of Green Point, in 
Cape Town, S. Afr. (2008).
See74.  confidential interview with a former resident of District Six, in Cape 
Town, S. Afr. (2008).
See75.  confidential interview with former residents of Kilnerton, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
See76.  confidential interview with former residents of Paarl, in the West-
ern Cape region, S. Afr. (2008).
Unfortunately, Ms. Valley’s cousins had to divide her deceased aunt’s 77. 
share by four, which left them with about R750 each.
See78.  confidential interview with a former residents of Paarl, in the West-
ern Cape region, S. Afr. (2008).
See 79. confidential interview with a former resident of Marabastad, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
Supra notes 23-27.80. 
Most of the Indians in the sample are upper-class, male entrepreneurs 81. 
who were all evicted from a community called Marabastad; their experience 
gives further credence to the theory that a person’s class affects how he 
spends the restitution award.  I interviewed 15 people from Marabastad, 
only 5 of which received financial compensation, and not one of these five 
financial awards had a substantial economic impact.  
See 82. confidential interview with former residents of Kilnerton, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
Id.83. 
Id.84. 
See85.  confidential interview with a former resident of Paarl, in the West-
ern Cape region, S. Afr. (2008).
Id86. .
Four of twenty-nine respondents purchased tombstones in the low 87. 
economic impact category and six of twenty-four purchased tombstones 
in the substantial economic impact category.
See88.  confidential interview with former residents of Kilnerton, in the 
Western Cape region, S. Afr. (2008).
Id89. .
See90.  confidential interview with a former resident of Sophiatown, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
See91.  confidential interview with a former resident of Kliptown, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
See92.  confidential interview with a former resident of Sophiatown, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
Of the twelve people in the sample aged seventy-six to one-hundred, 93. 
only two financial awards resulted in a substantial economic impact, six 
had a moderate economic impact, and four had a low economic impact.  
The awards the Commission gave to respondents in this age group ranged 
from R 2,000 to R 210,000 (approximately $ 285 to $ 30,000).   
See94.  confidential interview with a former resident of Kilnerton, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008). See confidential interview with a former 
resident of Kliptown, in the Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008)
See 95. confidential interview with a former resident of Kliptown, in the 
Gauteng region, S. Afr. (2008).
 Id.96. 
Id97. .
See98.  Interview with Linda Faleni, Regional Commissioner, Regional 
Land Claims Commission for Eastern Cape, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Jun. 17, 
2008).
Interview with Sincede Masiza, 99. supra note 47.
  100. See Interview with Humphrey Mashiyane, Deputy Director, Regional 
Land Claims Commission for Gauteng, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Jul. 08, 2008).
  Interview with Tozi Gwanya,101.  supra note 46.
  Anna Bohlin, 102. A Price on the Past: Cash as Compensation in South 
African Land Restitution, 38 CANADIAN J. AFR. STUD. 672, 675 (2004) 
(“One reason for choosing cash instead of land that was voiced by 
claimants in both towns was the perception that cash claims would be 
processed more quickly…claimants were skeptical regarding the prospect 
of collectively owning land, fearing conflicts and mismanagement.”).
  Edward Lahiff, 103. Land Reform in South Africa: A Status Report 2008 
37 (Program for Land and Agrarian Studies Research Report No. 38, 2008) 
(“Inadequate support to the beneficiaries of land reform has been a recur-
ring complaint almost since the inception of the programme.  Various stud-
ies have shown that beneficiaries experience severe problems accessing 
services such as credit, training, extension advice, transport and plowing 
services, and access to input and produce markets.”).
 104.  Id. (“The majority of [Communal Property Associations] are partly 
functional from an institutional perspective but are largely or totally dys-
functional in terms of allocation of individual resources and the defining of 
clear usage rights, responsibilities, powers and procedures for members 
and the decision making body.” ).
 105. Id.
 106. See generally DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST & FISHERIES 
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ANN. REP. 1 APRIL 2008—31 MARCH 2009 (2009) (S. AFR.).
  Id.107.
  108. See generally Bernadette Atuahene, From Reparations to Restora-
tion: Moving Beyond Restoring Property Rights to Restoring Political and 
Economic Visibility, 60 SMU L. REV. 1420 (2007).
 109. Id. at 1431-32 (“Property-induced invisibility is the confiscation or de-
struction of real property with no payment of just compensation, executed 
such that dehumanization occurs. The act is perpetrated by the state or 
other prevailing power structure(s) and adversely affects powerless people 
or people made powerless by the act, such that they are effectively left 
economically vulnerable and dependent on the state to satisfy their basic 
needs.”).  
 110.  Id. at 1444-45.
 111.  Id. at 1448 (“Restorative policies cannot afford to remain unduly rigid 
by failing to offer meaningful choices.  Instead, these policies must allow 
people to exercise their volition by choosing the mode of restoration that 
bests fits their idiosyncratic situation to the extent possible, and this will do a 
significant amount of work in restoring an invisible community or individual’s 
relationship to society.”).
  112. See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Pater-
nalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1159 (2003) (describ-
ing “libertarian paternalism,” which postulates that the government can 
find a middle ground between libertarianism and paternalism by providing 
incentives to promote certain choices.).
  Interview with Tozi Gwanya, 113. supra note 46.
  114. See generally, STEPHAN KOTKIN & SAJO ANDRAS, POLITICAL 
CORRUPTION IN TRANSITION: A SKEPTICS HANDBOOK (2002); AND ALI 
SHAUKAT, CORRUPTION: A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE (1985).
  Supra note 50.115.
  116. See generally CHERYL WALKER, LAND-MARKED:  LAND CLAIMS 
AND LAND RESTITUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2008) (arguing that the state 
should not base present policy on the master narrative of loss and restora-
tion.).
  Aliber, Roefs & Reitzes, A117. ssessing the Alignment of South Africa’s 
Land Reform Policy to People’s Aspirations and Expectation:  A Policy-
Oriented Report Based on a Survey in Three Provinces (Human Sciences 
Research Council Report for the Multi-country OECD Study on Measuring 
Human Rights, Democracy and Governance, 2006) (noting only 45 percent 
of respondents wanted their land restored to them).
  118. Supra notes 23-27.
 119.  See Former Highlands Residents: Ash v. Dep’t of Land Affairs LCC 
116/98 (2000) (stating that for determining just and equitable compensation, 
the equitable balance required by the Constitution will in most cases be best 
achieved by first determining the market value of the property and thereafter 
by subtracting from or adding to the amount of the market value, as other 
relevant circumstances may require).  The problem is that this comprehen-
sive definition of just compensation is applied only when the matter ends up 
in court otherwise the Commission bases its offer primarily on FMV.
 120.  Supra note 8.
 121.  Supra note 2.
  The equity enhancing factors are: “Current use of the property; the 122.
history of the acquisition and use of the property; the market value of the 
property; the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition 
and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and the purpose of the 
expropriation.” Id.
  Since 2004, the Commission has increasingly relied on eminent 123.
domain.  See Ruth Hall, Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa: A Status 
Report 2004 20-21 (Program for Land and Agrarian Studies Research Re-
port No. 20, 2004) (discussing the increased prevalence of expropriation by 
the Commission as a policy to combat inflated market prices in the willing 
buyer willing seller model).
 Michael Aliber & Reuben Mokoena, 124. The Interaction between the Land 
Redistribution Programme and the Land Market in South Africa: A Per-
spective on the Willing-Buyer/Willing-Seller Approach 24 (Programme for 
Land and Agrarian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 21, 2002).
  Interview with Tozi Gwanya,125.  supra note 46.
 126.  See e.g., Sarah Gavian & Marcel Fafchamps, Land Tenure and Alloc-
ative Efficiency in Niger, 78 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 460, 469 (1996) (using 
survey data from Niger to determine that tenure insecurity causes farmers 
to divert scarce resources to fields where there is greater tenure security); 
Stein Holden & Hailu Yohannes, Land Redistribution, Tenure Insecurity, and 
Intensity of Production: A Study of Farm Households in Southern Ethiopia, 
78 LAND ECON. 573, 575 (2002) (“Many authors . . . have argued that 
tenure insecurity discourages investment in land by removing the incen-
tives for it, as one may not be able to collect the expected flow of benefits 
of one’s efforts if there looms a threat of losing the land in the future.”); 
Simon Johnson et al., Property Rights and Finance, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 
1335, 1351 (2002) (finding that “[t]he most insecure firms’ investments” 
were 39 percent lower than the investment of “[f]irms with the most secure 
property rights”).
  See Interview with Fikile Bam, Chief Land Claims Court Judge, in 127.
Johannesburg, S. Afr. (June 19, 2010).
 128.  See Interview with Ria de Vos, supra note 52.
  129. See STEPHEN R. LEWIS, THE ECONOMICS OF APARTHEID 13, 
35, 40 (1990) (noting that racial discrimination deprived a majority of the 
South African population of avenues to economic development (such as 
land ownership) and led to income disparities between whites, Asians, 
coloureds and blacks during apartheid.).
  130. Id.
  131. Id.
  Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, 132. as amended by Act 48 of 
2003 §1 (S. Afr.).
  133. Supra note 52.
  Minister G. Nkwinti, Speech at the National Assembly, Parliament 134.
(Mar. 24, 2010)
  The role of choice is particularly important in rural community claims.  135.
These claims often involve a large number of beneficiaries.  If the majority 
chooses land restitution, then the Commission ignores the preferences 
of community members who would rather choose financial compensa-
tion.  Unfortunately, all too often only the few community members who 
are farming or grazing their animals on the land benefit directly.  The large 
number of beneficiaries makes governing and making a profit difficult.  See 
LUNGISILE NTSEBEZA & RUTH HALL, THE LAND QUESTION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSFORMATION AND REDISTRIBU-
TION, 179 (2007) (describing how Communal Property Associations forced 
a large number of beneficiaries to participate in complex group processes 
rather than treating them as individuals).  To promote a manageable num-
ber of beneficiaries the Commission should abandon majority rule and al-
low each family to choose between an array of options.  Less beneficiaries 
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defined, long-term use rights over a particular piece of the land.  
 136. Supra notes 23-27.

